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Articles
Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute
Settlement in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) and
Overlaps with the WTO and Other
Jurisdictions
By Joost Pauwelyn*

INTRODUCTION
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), the predecessor to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was established in April 1980 by
the Governments of nine Southern African countries.1 At that
time, one of SADCC's principal objectives was to reduce member
States' dependence on apartheid South Africa. 2 Since then, four
other Southern African countries, including South Africa, have
joined the Community. 3 SADC now covers broad economic and
* Associate Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; former legal advisor at
the WTO Secretariat. This paper was prepared for a SADC Round Table held in
Stellenbosch, South Africa, on 19 March 2003, hosted with the assistance of the
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC) and the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ). I would like to thank Sarah Dadush, Thandeka Dube,
Brian Sumner, and Jason Yackee for valuable research assistance in the preparation
of this paper.
1. Rosalind H. Thomas, Introductory Note to Treaty of the Southern African
Development Community, Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116, 117. The nine countries included: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Id.
2. Id.
3. See Amended Treaty of the Southern African Development Community,
Aug. 14, 2001, at http://www.sadc.int/index.php?lang=english&path=legalltreaties/
&page=amended declarationand-treaty of.sadc (last visited Jan. 30, 2004)
[hereinafter Amended SADC Treaty]. The original SADC Treaty was signed by all
nine SADCC member States, as well as Namibia. Treaty of the Southern African
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social sectors, ranging from energy to employment, culture to
trade, and human resource development to food. 4 The SADC
Treaty has twenty-two protocols attached to it, 5 one of which is
the Protocol on Trade, signed by twelve of the fourteen SADC
members on August 24, 1996.6 The Protocol on Trade aims to
establish a free trade area in the SADC region within eight
years from its entry into force. 7 In particular, this Article examines Annex VI to the SADC Protocol on Trade (Annex VI), which
concerns dispute settlement between SADC member States.8
Annex VI sets forth a trade dispute settlement mechanism between SADC members that is based largely on the World Trade
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism. 9
This Article consists of four parts. Part I examines the potential for overlap between the SADC dispute settlement
mechanism on trade and other international dispute settlement
regimes. It examines both regimes within the African region,10
as well as global regimes.1 1 Part I essentially asks whether it is
conceivable that a single dispute between SADC members falls
under the jurisdiction of both the SADC dispute settlement
mechanism on trade and the jurisdiction of another international court or tribunal.
Development Community, Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116, 135. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Seychelles, Mauritius and South Africa subsequently joined the
SADC. Amended SADC Treaty, supra.
4. SADC, Background: History, Evolution and Current Status, at
http://www.sadc.int/index.php?lang=english&path=aboutbackground&page=history
(last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
5. SADC, Protocols,at http://www.sadc.int/index.php?lang-english&path
=legal/protocols&page=index (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
6. See Southern African Development Community Protocol on Trade, Aug. 24,
1996, at http://www.sadc.int/index.php?lang=english&path=legal/protocols/&page=
p-trade (last visited Nov. 21, 2003), amended by the Amendment Protocol on Trade
in
the
Southern
African
Development
Community,
at
http://www.sadc.int/index.php?lang-english&path=legallprotocols/&page=p-trade
(last visited March 1, 2004) [hereinafter SADC Protocol on Txade]. Each of the fourteen SADC member States has signed the Amendment Protocol on Trade. Id.
7. Id. art. 3(1)(b).
8. Southern African Development Community Protocol on Trade, Annex VI, at
http://www.sadc.int/documents/trade/annex6.doc (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Annex VI].
9. Compare id., with Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter
DSU].
10. Examples include the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the African Union.
11. Examples include the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

2004]

GOING GLOBAL, REGIONAL, OR BOTH?

Part II continues on the assumption that there indeed may
be several international fora that have jurisdiction to deal with
a particular trade dispute between SADC members. It identifies the different factors that may influence SADC members to
bring a dispute either to SADC or to another international forum. Part II focuses in particular on the relative advantages
and disadvantages of bringing a complaint before the WTO as
compared to SADC.
Part III provides a comparative analysis of how other international regimes have addressed the problem of overlapping
fora. It examines the explicit conflict clauses set out in other
regional and bilateral trade regimes, such as the European Union (EU), the Southern Common Market Agreement
(MERCOSUR), the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and the South Africa-European Community Free
Trade Agreement. In addition, Part III describes treaty provisions in global regimes such as the WTO and the Energy Charter Treaty. Lastly, this part elaborates on the general principles
of law that international courts and tribunals may apply to resolve problems of jurisdictional overlap in situations where the
relevant treaties/agreements have no explicit conflict clauses.
Finally, Part IV provides concrete proposals to amend Annex VI so as to (1) avoid duplication of dispute settlement proceedings, and (2) steer parties to the forum that is, according to
a decision made by SADC members, best suited to resolve a particular dispute. Part IV offers several options and leaves it to
SADC members to select the option that is most appropriate to
meet their needs, and Part V offers some concluding remarks.
I.

POTENTIAL OVERLAPS

Under the current international framework, a situation
most certainly could arise in which a dispute between two SADC
Member States is brought before a trade panel under the SADC
Protocol on Trade and another international court or tribunal.
This overlap of jurisdiction could occur with reference to another
international court or tribunal that is either (1) dealing mainly
with trade-related disputes, or (2) not specifically dealing with
trade, but possessing a more general jurisdiction or another specialized jurisdiction other than trade. In both instances, such
other court or tribunal could exist either (1) within the African
region, or (2) beyond Africa, having a more global membership.
Perhaps obvious, any jurisdictional overlap with the SADC Pro-
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tocol on Trade can arise only with another international regime
that is binding on at least two SADC member States. The enumeration of potential overlaps in this section is illustrative only.
Especially when it comes to other non-trade related courts or
tribunals, this Article makes no attempt to be exhaustive.12
Before summing up other fora and the scope of their jurisdiction, it is important first to recall the jurisdiction of panels
under the SADC Protocol on Trade. The amended SADC Protocol on Trade provides that "[t]he rules and procedures of Annex
VI shall apply to the settlement of disputes between Member
States concerning their rights and obligations under this Proto13
col."

A.

OTHER TRADE-RELATED DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS

1.

Global Mechanisms: The WTO

The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) governs dispute settlements between WTO members. 14 The DSU applies to "disputes brought
pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions
of the agreements listed in Appendix 1" to the DSU, that is, the
so-called "covered agreements," which in practice covers almost
all WTO agreements. 15 Since all SADC members-with the exception of Seychelles-are also WTO members, and since many
provisions in the SADC Protocol on Trade import WTO provisions, there is a large overlap between the SADC Protocol on
Trade and WTO agreements as applied to SADC members.' 6 As
12.

On the general question of overlapping jurisdictions, see YUVAL SHANY, THE

COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003).

13. SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 32 (emphasis added); see also
Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 1.
14. DSU, supra note 9, art. 1.
15. Id.
16. Compare SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 11, with General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. III, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33
I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; compare SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 10, with GATT 1994, supra, art. XXI; compare SADC Protocol on
Trade, supra note 6, arts. 18, 19, with GATT 1994, supra, art. VI; compare SADC
Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 20, with Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1869 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards]; compare SADC
Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 23, with General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
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a result, many trade disputes between SADC members can be
brought to the trade dispute settlement mechanism of either
SADC or the WTO.
For example, if Malawi were to impose new quantitative
import restrictions on leather products from South Africa, then
South Africa could bring a claim to SADC under Article 7 of the
Protocol on Trade 17 or to the WTO under Article XI of GATT
1994.18 Similarly, if South Africa were to impose internal taxes
or regulations that favor national tobacco products as against
tobacco products imported from, for example, Tanzania, then
Tanzania could bring a complaint to SADC under Article 11 of
the SADC Protocol on Trade or to the WTO under Article III of
GATT 1994. This is so because both provisions impose an obligation to provide national treatment, or rather an obligation not
to treat imports differently from domestic products once inside
the country. 19
However, from the outset one should note that African nations have hardly been involved in WTO dispute settlement. In
fact, not a single African WTO Member has initiated a formal
complaint under the DSU. Moreover, only four official complaints have ever been initiated against African WTO Members. 20 Thus far, none of these four complaints has led to the establishment of a WTO Panel. Consequently, of the ninety-eight
an
WTO Panel Reports completed at present, none has 2involved
1
defendant.
or
complainant
as
member,
WTO
African
tion, Annex 1B, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND

OF MULTILATERAL

TRADE

NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 325, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994); compare SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 24, with Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
17. SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 7.
18. GATT 1994, supra note 16, art. XI.
19. Compare SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 11, with GATT 1994,
supranote 16, art. III.
20. Two of these complaints were against South Africa. WTO Dispute Panel
Report, Request for Consultations by India, South Africa-Anti-dumping Duties on
Certain Pharmaceutical Products from India, WT/DS168/1 (Apr. 13, 1999),
http://www.wto.org; WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for Consultations by Turkey, South Africa-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Blanketing from Turkey,
WT/DS288/1 (Apr. 15, 2003), http://www.wto.org. The other two complaints were
against Egypt. WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for Consultations by Turkey,
Egypt-DefinitiveAnti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey, WTIDS211/1
(Nov. 7, 2000), http://www.wto.org; WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for Consultations by Thailand, Egypt-Import Prohibitionon Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil,
WT[DS205/1 (Sept. 27, 2000), http://www.wto.org.
21. However, two African nations, Mauritius and Zimbabwe, have been third
parties before a WTO Panel. Mauritius was a third party before three WTO Dispute
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Mechanisms within Africa

a. Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
Five SADC members also constitute SACU. They are Bot22
swana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.
SACU was recently re-negotiated in October 2002,23 and the

agreement (not yet in force) envisions the creation of an ad hoc
SACU Tribunal established to settle "[a]ny dispute regarding
the interpretation or application of this [SACU] Agreement, or
24
any dispute arising thereunder at the request of the Council."
As a result, an overlap with SADC exists, as certain trade disputes between Member States of both SACU and SADC could be
brought to either the SACU Tribunal or an SADC trade panel.
b. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)"
Nine of the fourteen SADC members also belong to
COMESA.25 The COMESA Treaty of 1994 foresees the creation
of a COMESA Court of Justice. 26 The Court "shall ensure the
Panels. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, European Communities-Conditions for
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246R, para. 1.7 (Dec.
1, 2003), http://www.wto.org; WTO Dispute Panel Report, Mexico-Anti-Dumping
Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)from the United States-Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS132/RW, para. 1.6 (June 22,
2001), http://www.wto.org; WTO Dispute Panel Report, European CommunitiesRegime for the Importation, Sale and Distributionof Bananas-Recourseto Article
21.5 by the European Communities, WT/DS276/RW/EEC, para. 1.4 (Apr. 12, 1999),
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Bananas]. Zimbabwe has been a third party to one
WTO Dispute Panel. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, European CommunitiesMeasures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT[DS135/R, para.
1.5 (Sept. 18, 2000), http://www.wto.org. For more statistics on WTO dispute settlement, see the subscription website http://www.wordtradelaw.net (last visited Dec.
2, 2003).
22. Southern African Customs Union Agreement, Oct. 21, 2002, at
http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=961 (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
23. Id.
24. Id. art. 13(1).
25. Compare
COMESA,
Member
States,
available
at
http://www.comesa.int/countries (last visited Jan. 28, 2004), with supra notes 1, 3.
The five SADC member countries that do not belong to COMESA are Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, and South Africa. Compare COMESA, Member
States, availableat http://www.comesa.int/countries (last visited Jan. 28, 2004), with
supra notes 1, 3.
26. Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa,
Nov. 5, 1993, art. 7(1)(c), 33 I.L.M. 1067, 1076 (1994), available at
http://www.comesa.int/about/treaty/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) [hereinafter
COMESA Treaty].
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adherence to law in the interpretation and application" of the
COMESA Treaty. 27 The Court can hear disputes under the
COMESA Treaty as between member states, as well as disputes
referred to it by the COMESA Secretary-General or private parties.28 In 1998, the Rules of the Court of Justice were adopted,
and the Court is now in operation, 29 although it has yet to hear
a dispute. A trade dispute between SADC members that are
also COMESA members could be brought to either the
COMESA Court of Justice or an SADC trade panel.
c. Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and
the East African Community (EAC)
Two SADC members, Angola and the Democratic Republic
of Congo, are also members of ECCAS. 30 ECCAS was estab31
lished in 1983, and its structure includes a Court of Justice.
ECCAS has been largely inactive since 1992.32 However, in case
it is made operational again, an overlap with SADC could arise,
in that Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo could
submit a trade dispute to either ECCAS or an SADC trade
panel.
One SADC member, Tanzania, is also a member of the
34
EAC. 33 EAC provides for an East African Court of Justice.
However, since Tanzania is the only country that belongs both
to the SADC and the EAC, a dispute between two SADC members could not be brought to the EAC. 35 Thus, at present, no
risk of overlap exists.

27. Id. art. 19, 33 I.L.M. at 1080.
28. Id. arts. 24-26, 33 I.L.M. at 1080-81.
29. See The Rules of Court of the Court of Justice of the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa, May 1, 2003, at http://www.comesa.int/institutions/
court-ofjustice/rules/Rules%20of/o20Court/en (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
30. See ECCAS, About Us, at http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/about/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2003).
31. Id.
32. Id.
at
30,
1999,
Nov.
Treaty,
Community
African
33. East
http://66.110.17.178/documents/EAC%2OTreaty.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter EAC Treaty].
34. Id. art. 9.
35. See id. art. 27(1). The EAC Court of Justice would not have jurisdiction
because it can only hear cases between EAC members. Id.
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d. African Economic Community
In 1991, the Abuja Treaty established the African Economic
Community as an integral part of what is now the African Union (then the Organization for African Unity). 36 It also created a
Court of Justice. 37 This Court "shall ensure the adherence to
law in the interpretation and application of this Treaty and
shall decide on disputes submitted thereto pursuant to this
Treaty." 38 Member States of the African Economic Community
can bring actions against each other before this Court in respect
to "any dispute regarding the interpretation or the application of
39
the provisions of this Treaty."
Since all SADC members are also parties to the Abuja
Treaty-a treaty that, like the SADC Protocol on Trade, deals
largely with trade matters-many trade disputes as between
SADC members could be brought either before an SADC trade
panel or the Court of Justice of the African Economic Community.
Nonetheless, the Abuja Treaty recognizes the importance of
smaller regional economic communities within parts of the African Union, such as SADC and COMESA. The Abuja Treaty
provides that "[d]uring the first stage, Member States undertake to strengthen the existing regional economic communities
and to establish new communities where they do not exist in or40
der to ensure the gradual establishment of the Community."
The Treaty also states that the African Economic Community
"shall be established mainly through the coordination, harmonization and progressive integration of the activities of regional
economic communities." 41 To this effect, the Treaty provides
that "Member States may conclude economic, technical or cultural agreements with one or several Member States, and with
Third States, regional and sub-regional organizations or any
other international organization, provided that such agreements
are not incompatible with the provisions of this Treaty."42 As a
result, although there is an overlap between SADC and the Af-

36. Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, June 3, 1991, art.
1(c), 30 I.L.M. 1241, 1251 available at http://www.africa-union.org (last visited Nov.
21, 2003) [hereinafter Abuja Treaty].
37. Id. art. 18, 30 I.L.M. at 1259.
38. Id. art. 18(2), 30 I.L.M. at 1259.
39. Id. art. 87, 30 I.L.M. at 1279.
40. Id. art. 28(1), 30 I.L.M. at 1261.
41. Id. art. 88(1), 30 I.L.M. at 1279.
42. Abuja Treaty, supra note 36, art. 93(1), 30 I.L.M. at 1280.
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rican Economic Community, it would seem that the Abuja
Treaty favors the resolution of disputes at the sub-regional level
(such as at the SADC or COMESA level).
B. OTHER DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS NOT
SPECIFICALLY DEALING WITH TRADE
1.

Mechanisms within Africa

a. SADC Tribunal
The amended SADC Treaty establishes the SADC Tribunal. 43 Article 32 of the amended SADC Treaty states: "Any dis-

pute arising from the interpretation or application of this
Treaty, the interpretation, application or validity of Protocols or
other subsidiary instruments made under this Treaty, which
44
cannot be settled amicably, shall be referred to the Tribunal."
The first question that arises in respect of the SADC Tribunal is
whether disputes under the SADC Protocol on Trade could also
be decided by the SADC Tribunal (that is, in addition to the
trade panel system set out in Annex VI). The SADC Treaty, as
amended, explicitly states that the Tribunal is competent also to
hear disputes arising from "the interpretation, application or validity of Protocols ...

made under this Treaty."45 This compe-

tence of the Tribunal to deal with disputes under SADC protocols, seemingly including the Protocol on Trade, is not explicitly
carved out by the Protocol on Trade, nor by Annex VI, which
creates the specific mechanism to deal with SADC trade disputes. 46 This means that it is possible for the same dispute un-

der the Protocol on Trade between two SADC members to be
brought by one of them to a trade panel under Annex VI and to
the SADC Tribunal by the other member. In that case, an overlap may occur since SADC rules do not explicitly delineate the
respective competences of the SADC Tribunal and SADC trade
panels.
In addition, another risk of overlap arises: Although a trade
panel under Annex VI initially may decide a trade dispute, the
SADC member that loses before this panel may want to "appeal"
43.
44.
45.
46.

Amended SADC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 9(g).
Id. art. 32.
Id.
Annex VI, supra note 8.
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or re-litigate that dispute before the SADC Tribunal, based on
47
Article 32 of the SADC Treaty.
A third problem that may arise in respect of the SADC
Tribunal is a situation in which one SADC member thinks that
its dispute with another SADC member falls under the general
SADC Treaty and/or one of its protocols other than the one on
trade, while the opposing SADC member in the dispute insists
that the dispute falls under the SADC Protocol on Trade. As a
result, the first member would bring the dispute to the SADC
Tribunal, and the second member would bring it to a trade
panel under Annex VI.
This potential for overlap is particularly serious when it
pertains to the Memorandum of Understanding on Standardization, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM),
on the one hand, and the Protocol on Trade, especially Article 17
thereof on "Standards and Technical Regulations on Trade," on
the other.48 Not only is there a risk of substantive overlap in
terms of the subject matters that are covered by these two protocols, in addition, both the Memorandum of Understanding on
SQAM and the SADC Protocol on Trade have their own panel
systems for the settlement of disputes. The Memorandum of
Understanding on SQAM provides:
4. In case of disagreement, the Member States may take recourse to a
panel of experts in the SQAM area concerned.
5.

The appointment, composition, powers and functions of the panels

of SQAM experts shall be determined by the CMT.
6. As a last resort, disputes regarding the implementation and application of this MOU
shall be settled in accordance with Article 32 of the
49
SADC Treaty.

Hence, a dispute regarding a technical barrier to trade as
between two SADC members may fall within the competence of
both a trade panel and a SQAM panel, the latter being subject,
in turn, to review "as a last resort" by the SADC Tribunal.

47.

Amended SADC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 32. On the appeal question, see

infra note 155.

48. Compare SADC Memorandum of Understanding on SQAM, art. 13(4)-(6),
at http://www.sadc.int/index.php?lang=english&path=legal/moa/&page=moa-sqam
(last visited Feb. 11, 2004), with SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 17 (setting out the provisions for the determination of standards in trade).
49. SADC Memorandum of Understanding on SQAM, supranote 48, art. 13(4)-
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b. Court of Justice of the African Union
All SADC members are also members of the African Union. 50 The Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted on
July 11, 2000, provides: "(1) A Court of Justice of the Union
shall be established; (2) The statute, composition and functions
of the Court of Justice shall be defined in a protocol relating
thereto."5 1 At present, this Court has yet to be established.
However, there is potential for overlap, in that one dispute between SADC members could be referred to either, or both, the
Court of Justice of the African Union and an SADC trade panel.
2.

Global mechanisms

a. International Court of Justice (ICJ)
There may also be disputes between SADC members for
which the ICJ has jurisdiction, so that a single dispute could be
brought to either, or both an SADC trade panel and the ICJ.
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations
(UN), and its jurisdictional reach is delineated by Article 36 of
the ICJ Statute.5 2 States may refer cases to the ICJ ex ante in
treaties or ex post in specific agreements related to the settlement of a particular dispute.5 3 States may also make ex ante
declarations in which they "recognize as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court" in all,
54
or a certain type, of legal disputes.
Such declarations, pursuant to Article 36 of the ICJ Statute,
were made by six of the fourteen SADC members, namely Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauri-

50. African
Union,
Member
States,
at
http://www.africaunion.org/homeWelcome.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
51. Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 18, 8 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 479, 490
(2000), availableat http://www.africa-union.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
52. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
(1954), available at http://www.un.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
53. Id. art. 36(1), 59 Stat. at 1060.
54. Id. art. 36(2), 59 Stat. at 1060.
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tius, and Swaziland. 55 However, in all but the Democratic Republic of Congo's declaration, the jurisdiction thus conferred on
the ICJ does not extend to disputes in which the parties have
agreed or shall agree to recourse through the use of some other
56
method of peaceful settlement.
As a result, since all SADC members agreed on "some other
method of peaceful settlement" when it comes to disputes between SADC members under Annex VI, the ICJ's compulsory
jurisdiction does not extend to disputes under the SADC Protocol on Trade. Thus, the risk of overlap with ICJ jurisdiction is
limited, and in practice would only materialize where both disputing SADC Member State parties specifically agree to send a
particular trade dispute to the ICJ57

An ongoing trade dispute involving Nicaragua, Colombia,
and Honduras illustrates the possibility of overlaps between a
specialized trade entity and the more general ICJ. In 1999,
Honduras and Colombia ratified a bilateral treaty on maritime
delimitation in the Caribbean Sea.5 8 Nicaragua, however, con-

sidered that this treaty infringed its territorial rights in the
Caribbean Sea. 59 In response, and allegedly to safeguard its security, it imposed additional taxes on goods imported from Honduras and Columbia and cancelled fishing licenses for vessels
under the Honduran or the Colombian flag. 60

In turn, both

Honduras and Columbia challenged these trade-related Nicaraguan measures before the WTO. 61

Later, Nicaragua referred

the dispute to the ICJ, requesting the Court to determine the
course of the single maritime boundary appertaining respectively to Nicaragua and Honduras. 62 This case is still pending
55. See International Court of Justice, DeclarationsRecognizing as Compulsory
the Jurisdictionof the Court, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/
ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
56.

See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL at

13, 19-21, 25-26, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/Ser.E/21, U.N. Sales No. E.03.V.3 (2003).
57. See Annex VI, supra note 8.
58. See Application by Nicaragua, Instituting Proceedings in Case Concerning
Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicar. v. Hond.) (Dec. 8, 1999), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iNH/
iNHframe.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
59. Id.
60. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by
Colombia, Nicaragua Measures Affecting Imports from Honduras and Colombia,
WT/DS188/2 (Mar. 28, 2000), http://www.wto.org.
61. See id.; WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for Consultations by Colombia,
Nicaragua-MeasuresAffecting Imports from Honduras and Colombia, WT/DS188/1
(Jan. 20, 2000), http://www.wto.org.
62. See Maritime Delimitation Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib-
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before the ICJ; the WTO panel on the trade aspect of the dispute, though not officially suspended, has been inactive for more
than three years, and in fact, the panel has never been com63
posed.
b. Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The SADC trade regime may also overlap with other specialized global regimes not related to trade, such as enforcement
regimes under MEAs or the UNCLOS. For example, one dispute between SADC members may have a trade component falling under the Protocol on Trade and an environmental component subject to an MEA that is binding on both SADC members.
MEAs are most commonly enforced through so-called noncompliance regimes. 64 Such non-compliance regimes are not
contentious in nature and do not involve adjudication. 65 They
rely instead on committee reports and reviews. 66 Since these
proceedings do not constitute adjudication, it is difficult to speak
of jurisdictional overlap. Nonetheless, many MEAs also include
provisions on the settlement of disputes by third-party adjudication. 67 Disagreements arising from the interpretation or application of an MEA can then be referred to the ICJ or arbitration.
In most cases, such adjudication will necessitate a specific ex
post agreement. 6s This in part explains why MEAs have not
been enforced through adjudication. Consequently, the risk of
overlap of MEA adjudication mechanisms with the SADC panel
bean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), Application Instituting Proceedings (Dec. 8, 1999), at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iNHIiNH-orders/lnh-iapplication19991208.pdf.
63. See Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/17, 36 (Nov. 28,
2003), http://www.wto.org.
64. See, e.g., OZONE
SECRETARIAT,
U.N. ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME,
HANDBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE

LAYER 295 (6th ed. 2003), available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/publications/
Handbook-2003.pdf.
65. See Alan E. Boyle, Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement of
InternationalEnvironmental Law Through InternationalInstitutions, 3 J. ENVTL. L.
229, 233-44 (1991).
66. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987, arts. 7-8, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, 35 available at
http://www.unep.org/ozone/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22,
1985, art. 11(3), T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293, 331, 26 I.L.M. 1516, 1534
available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/viennaconvention2002.pdf; Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 27(3), 31 I.L.M. 818, 834.
68. See ICJ Statute, supra note 52, art. 36(1).
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regime for trade disputes is, for practical purposes, very limited.
In contrast, most provisions of UNCLOS can be enforced
through compulsory adjudication. 69 Pursuant to UNCLOS, contracting parties are free to choose one or more of the following
means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex
70
VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.

All of these jurisdictional grounds may overlap with the
SADC trade panel mechanism in case a particular dispute between SADC members has both trade and law of the sea components. That disputes may have both trade and law of the sea
components was confirmed recently in a dispute between Chile
and the European Communities (EC). 71 In 2000, the EC obtained the establishment of a WTO panel to examine a Chilean
prohibition on unloading of swordfish in Chilean ports and certain Chilean measures of conservation and management relating to the population of swordfish including that of the high
seas. 72 The EC alleged violations of Articles V and XI of GATT
1994 (respectively, on freedom of transit and the general elimination on quantitative restrictions). 73 Subsequently, however,
Chile referred the same dispute to arbitration under UNCLOS,
focusing this time on EC obligations of conservation of swordfish
under UNCLOS. 74 Later, both parties agreed to have the dis69. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, art. 287, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 509-10, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1322-23, available
at
http://www.un.org/Deptsllos/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/unclos-e.pdf.
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
70. Id.
71. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for Consultationsby the European
Communities, Chile-MeasuresAffecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish,
WT/DS193/1 (Apr. 26, 2000), http://www.wto.org.
72. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for the Establishmentof a Panel by
the European Communities, Chile-MeasuresAffecting the Transit and Importation

of Swordfish, WT/DS193/2 (Nov. 7, 2000), http://www.wto.org.
73. Id.
74. Case 7, Order 2000/3, Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. Eur.
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pute settled by a special Chamber of the International Tribunal
of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). 75 However, in March 2001, they
reached a provisional arrangement concerning the dispute and
76
suspended both the ITLOS and WTO proceedings.
C.

CONCLUSION OF PART I

There is no doubt that overlaps exist between the SADC
dispute settlement mechanism on trade and other dispute settlement mechanisms. Some of these other mechanisms are also
trade-related (WTO, SACU, COMESA, or the African Economic
Community), others have a more general jurisdiction (SADC
Tribunal, Court of Justice of the African Union, or ICJ) and still
others have a non-trade related specialized jurisdiction (MEAs
or ITLOS). Some of these other mechanisms are within the African region; others are more universal. The table on the next
page illustrates this rather wide potential for overlap.

Cmty.), (Dec. 20, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 475, 476, available at http://www.itlos.org/
casedocuments/2001/document en 100.doc (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
75. See Case 7, Order 2001/1, Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable
Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. Eur.
Cmty.), (Mar. 15, 2001), at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2004).
76. See id.; WTO Dispute Panel Report, Communication from the European
Communities, Chile-MeasuresAffecting the Transit and Importationof SwordfishArrangement Between the European Communities and Chile, WT/DS193/3 (Apr. 6,
2001), http://www.wto.org.
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Table 1
Other International Courts or Tribunals that May
Overlap with the Mandate of SADC Trade Panels

TRADE
RELATED

WITHIN AFRICA

GLOBAL

*Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Tribunal

*WTO panels/Appellate
Body

*Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Court of
Justice
*Economic Community of
Central African States
(ECCAS) Court of Justice
*African Economic Community Court of Justice

NOT TRADE
RELATED

*SADC Tribunal

*International Court of
Justice (ICJ)

*Court of Justice of the African Union
*UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

II. FACTORS AT PLAY IN "FORUM SHOPPING": THE SADC
REGIME COMPARED TO THE WTO
Forum shopping has been defined as a litigant's attempt "to
have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where
he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict."77 Now that it has been demonstrated that jurisdictional

77. Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1990)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 590 (5th ed. 1979)).
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overlaps exist for the settlement of trade-related disputes as between SADC members, Part II examines why a disputing SADC
member may prefer the SADC trade mechanism as opposed to
another forum, or vice versa. Particular attention will be paid
to how the SADC mechanism compares to the dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO. Without claiming to be exhaustive, the following factors will be examined: (1) cost of litigation;
(2) the organizational context in which the dispute would be decided; (3) who decides the dispute; (4) any advantages in the applicable law; (5) who can initiate a complaint and against whom;
(6) any procedural advantages; (7) any special procedures for
least-developed countries; (8) the possibility of appeal; (9) what
remedies can be obtained; (10) who is bound by the eventual ruling; and (11) what happens in the event of non-compliance.
A.

COST OF LITIGATION

1.

Expenses of the Adjudicator

Annex VI states: "[t]he remuneration of panelists and experts, their travel and lodging expenses and all other general
expenses of panels shall be borne in equal parts by the disputing
Member States or in a proportion as determined by a panel."78

Annex VI also provides that SADC's Committee of Ministers responsible for Trade Matters (CMT) "shall determine the
amounts of remuneration and expenses that will be paid to panelists and experts appointed in terms of this Annex." 79 So far,
no such determination has been made.
In contrast, the DSU provides that "[p]anelists' expenses,
including travel and subsistence allowance, shall be met from
the WTO budget... ."8o Pursuant to the DSU, the expenses of
81
Appellate Body members are also met from the WTO budget.
Moreover, practice shows that experts who were appointed by
WTO panels are paid not by the parties themselves, but from
the regular WTO budget.8 2 Consequently, regarding expenses of
persons involving in adjudications, the WTO regime offers a
clear advantage: At the WTO, disputing parties do not have to
78. Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 19(2).
79. Id. art. 19(1).
80. DSU, supra note 9, art. 8(11).
81. Id. art. 17(8).
82. See id. app. 4; Joost Pauwelyn, The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 325-64 (2002).
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pay any of these expenses, while at SADC these expenses must
be paid by the disputing parties themselves ("in equal parts" or
"ina proportion as determined by a panel"8 3). Note, however,
that WTO panelists who are government officials only get a
travel and subsistence allowance from the WTO budget; 84 the
cost of the actual work continues to be borne by the government
employing the panelist.8 5 It may be a heavy burden for developing WTO member States with limited resources to replace officials spending official time on a WTO Panel, especially if that
Panel does not involve the country's trade interests. To that extent, to require that the disputing parties pay for all panelists,
8 6
as Annex VI does, may be preferable for developing countries.
WTO panelists who are non-governmental, in contrast, receive
600 CHF per day of work, in addition to their travel and subsistence allowances (all of this coming exclusively from the WTO
budget).8 7 Again, in SADC, however, all costs of all panelists
88
are borne by the disputing parties themselves.
2.

Litigation expenses

Other expenses-such as those related to government officials working on the case on behalf of their government, as well
as any outside counsel that may be hired to assist the government-are borne by the disputing parties themselves in both the
SADC and WTO systems. However, the WTO system does have
one advantage, which is that the WTO Secretariat must "make
available a qualified legal expert from the WTO technical cooperation services to any developing country member which so requests."8 9 In addition, when litigating a dispute before the
WTO, SADC members also may take advantage of the newly established Advisory Centre on WTO Law in Geneva. 90 This center offers free legal advice to its developing country members
83.

Annex VI, supra note 8,art. 19(2).

84.

DSU, supra note 9, art. 8(11).

85. Id. art. 8(8) (stating, "[m]embers shall undertake, as a general rule, to permit their officials to serve as panelists.").
86. This is only true up to the point that they, in turn, become disputing parties.
87. See Dispute Settlement Body, Communication from Canada-Contribution
of Canada to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding,
TN/DSJW/41, 14 (Jan. 24, 2003), http://www.wto.org.
88. Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 19(2).
89. DSU, supra note 9, art. 27(2).
90. See Advisory Centre on WTO Law, Homepage, at http://www.acwl.ch (last
visited Nov. 21, 2003).
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and all least developed countries that are WTO members (even
those that are not members of the Center), 91 up to a certain
number of hours. 92 Beyond that, the Centre charges an hourly
fee that is set below market value and that depends on the stage
of development of each member. 93 To note, SADC members are
currently discussing the idea of a similar "Dispute Resolution
94
Center."
In contrast, a potential disadvantage of bringing a case to
the WTO instead of to SADC is that the place of litigation is further away (Geneva, Switzerland versus Gaborone, Botswana).
This may increase travel and communication expenses. In addition, given the complexity of WTO agreements and the highly
developed GATT/WTO jurisprudence that has developed over
the years, litigating a WTO case may be more complicated-and
hence more expensive-than litigating an SADC dispute.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT IN WHICH THE DISPUTE WOULD
BE DECIDED

SADC is a regional organization; the WTO is a worldwide
organization. As the following demonstrates, each of these contexts has its own advantages, depending on the particular interests involved.
On the one hand, it may be seen as a sign of African unity,
or at least coordination, to settle a dispute that is solely between
two African nations under the SADC umbrella. After all, one of
the tasks of SADC is to "promote the coordination and harmonization of the international relations of Member States." 95 The
Protocol on Trade also calls for Member States to "coordinate
their trade policies and negotiating positions in respect of rela-

91. SADC members that are least-developed countries include: Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. See U.N.
Comm.
on
Trade
and
Dev.,
Least
Developed
Countries,
at
http://www.unctad.org/templates/countries.asp?intItemID=1676
(last visited Nov.
21, 2003).
92. See Advisory
Centre on WTO Law,
Services and Fees, at
http://www.acwl.ch/services/SubmenuServ.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). The precise number of hours the Advisory Centre will provide free-of-charge to developing
country members is determined by the stage of the proceedings when assistance is
requested. Id.
93. Id.
94. Proposed Amendments by Mozambique to SADC Protocol on Trade Annex
VI, art. 21 [hereinafter Proposed Amendments] (on file with the Minnesota Journal
of Global Trade).
95. SADC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5(2)(h), 32 I.L.M. at 125.
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tions with third countries."96 Settling a dispute between SADC
members under the SADC umbrella may be particularly important where the dispute involves sensitivities or complexities
that are unique to the SADC region.
On the other hand, SADC members may also see benefits in
bringing a dispute with another SADC member to the worldwide level of the WTO. To do so may exert more pressure on the
defendant country since more countries would then be notified
of an alleged violation. This could be particularly helpful for an
SADC complainant that does not have much influence in the
SADC context. Moreover, when the disputed measure not only
affects SADC members but also other members of the WTO, the
complainant may find valuable support with other nations that
it would not otherwise have under the SADC mechanism. In
those cases where the dispute also affects non-SADC members
of the WTO, it may also be of interest to the defendant to have
the case decided finally at the WTO. This may avoid having to
go through a series of proceedings, first at SADC (where the
measure may be found legal), then at the WTO (at the request of
a WTO member that was not involved in the SADC dispute).
Note, however, that this risk of duplication to the detriment of
the defendant is mitigated by the fact that if a defendant wins
under SADC-where rules are likely to be stricter (given that
SADC is to become a free trade area)-it is likely to win also at
the WTO.
C.

WHO DECIDES THE DISPUTE?

The required qualifications of the panelists that decide the
dispute are generally the same under both the SADC mecha97
nism and the DSU. Annex VI is partly copied from the DSU.
In both systems, the independence of panelists is vital. However, under the SADC regime, parties have greater influence in
selecting panelists than they do under the DSU. In the WTO,
nominations for all panelists (including the chair) are proposed
by the WTO Secretariat. 98 If there is no agreement on all panelists within twenty days, then the Director-General of the WTO
appoints the panelists, based on substantive criteria, not by
lot. 99

96.
97.
98.
99.

SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 29.
CompareAnnex VI, supranote 8, art. 7, with DSU, supra note 9, art. 8.
See DSU, supra note 9, art. 8(6).
See id. art. 8(7).
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In contrast, in SADC the parties themselves first agree on a
chair. 100 If they cannot agree within fifteen days, the Executive
Secretary of SADC appoints the chair by lot. 10 1 Once the chair
is appointed-and here is the major difference with the selection
of WTO panelists-each party then appoints one panelist for
which neither prior Secretariat nominations nor the agreement
of the opposing party is required. 10 2 This procedure resembles
the selection procedure that is often followed in commercial arbitrations, and it may create the impression that each party has
its own panelist, which, in turn, may put pressure on partyelected panelists to vote in favor of the party that selected him
or her. Thus, SADC may be attractive to litigants because it offers more control to the disputing parties in the selection of panelists, but may undermine the legitimacy of the process and put
too much pressure or decision-making authority on the chair of
the panel, the only panelist not appointed by a single party.
On the other hand, a potential advantage of bringing a
complaint to SADC instead of the WTO is that SADC panelists
come from Africa. Therefore, they may be more apprehensive of
the facts and sensitivities involved in the case. In contrast, very
few WTO panelists are nationals of African nations: of the
ninety-eight completed WTO panel reports so far, only nineteen
10 3
panels had a panel member with an African nationality.
None of these nineteen panels involved a WTO Member from
Africa. 104 Moreover, none of the complainants or defendants of
the panels were African nations. 105 With regard to the WTO
Appellate Body, only one of the seven members has been an Af-

100. See Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 8(2)(a). This is done without any prior
nominations by the SADC Secretariat. Id.
101. Id. art. 8(3).
102. See id. art. 8(2)(b).
103. One national of Mauritius served on two panels, five nationals of South Africa served on a total of nine panels, and two nationals of Egypt served on a total of
See WorldTradeLaw.net, WTO Panelists, by Country, at
eight panels.
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/panelistcountryl .asp (subscription site)
(last visited Dec. 3, 2003) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade) [hereinafter WTO Panelists]; WorldTradeLaw.net, Count of WTO Panelists,by Country, at
(subscription
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/panelistcountrycount.asp
site) (last visited Dec. 3, 2003) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade)
[hereinafter Count of WTO Panelists].
104. WTO Panelists,supra note 103; Count of WTO Panelists,supra note 103.
105. WTO Panelists,supra note 103; Count of WTO Panelists,supra note 103.
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10 6
rican national, more particularly a national of Egypt.
Leaving aside the comparison between SADC and the
WTO (which are both trade mechanisms), when the jurisdictional overlap is one between SADC and another tribunal having a more general jurisdiction, the expertise of the panelists/judges involved may be an important factor in selecting the
most appropriate forum. Because of the specialized nature of
the forum, it can be expected that most WTO trade panelists
will be trade experts. On the other hand, no such expertise is
expected from, for example, ICJ or SADC Tribunal Judges, for
both of these fora have more general jurisdiction. If the dispute
involves complex trade issues, this factor may militate in favor
of the SADC trade mechanism.
When it comes to overlaps between the SADC trade mechanism and other, non-trade related specialized mechanisms, such
as those under MEAs or UNCLOS, the question of expertise becomes even more important. If a dispute has, for example, a
trade and an environmental component, it may be crucial (even
in terms of the outcome of the dispute) to send the dispute to
trade experts and not to environmental experts, or vice versa.
In those cases, in addition to expertise, the claim may be raised
that trade experts are inherently biased against trade restrictions, whereas environmental experts could be accused of bias in
favor of all measures aimed at protecting the environment.
Finally, a difference also exists between tribunals that are
constituted on an ad hoc basis, for a particular dispute only
(such as SADC trade panels and WTO panels), 107 and standing
courts or tribunals whose members are selected for a number of
years and hence exercise their judicial function for a longer period of time (such as the WTO Appellate Body, the SADC Tribunal, or the ICJ). For example, such standing tribunals could be
expected to be more experienced as well as more open to scrutiny and, therefore, potentially more objective.

D.

ADVANTAGES IN THE APPLICABLE LAW

The applicable law in resolving a dispute may also influence
forum selection. This factor is important for a complainant, as
106. From 1995-2000, Said El-Naggar; from 2000-present, Georges Abi-Saab.
WorldTradeLaw.net, Individual Appellate Body Members: Background Information
and Cases Served On, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/
abmembers.htm (subscription site) (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
107. See DSU, supra note 9, art. 6; Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 5.
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it asks under what treaty its claim stands the best chance. It is
also important for a defendant, as it asks itself, what defenses
are available under the respective treaties/agreements?
As noted earlier, SADC trade panels have jurisdiction only
to examine claims under the SADC Protocol on Trade. 108 In
turn, WTO panels can entertain claims only under WTO covered
agreements. 109 Considering that one of SADC's goals is to become a free trade area within eight years, 110 coupled with the
fact that the WTO is not a free trade area, 111 in most cases
SADC rules will be stricter. As a result, complainants will often
have an incentive to bring their case to SADC, not to the WTO.
An SADC panel is instructed to examine disputes "in the
light of the relevant provisions of this Protocol [on tradel." 112 A
WTO panel must "address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute." 113

Thus, with regard to defendants, they can invoke at

least all defenses enumerated, respectively, in the SADC Protocol on Trade or WTO covered agreements. Although in principle, given the free trade area features of SADC, the defenses
available under SADC will be more limited than those available
at the WTO, exceptions may exist that are written only in the
SADC Treaty and not present under WTO rules. In those cases,
where a defense is available at SADC but not at the WTO, complainants may want to bring their case to the WTO instead of
SADC.114

However, when it comes to the availability of defenses as a
108. See Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 1.
109. See DSU, supranote 9, art. 1.
110. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting where trade restrictions as
between SADC members will, in principle, be outlawed).
111. As such, under WTO rules, many trade restrictions between WTO members
remain. Cf. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605
[hereinafter NAFTA] and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr.15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
112. Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 9(a).
113. DSU, supranote 9, art. 7(2).
114. See, e.g., WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for the Establishment of a
Panel by the United States, Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals,
WT/DS31/2 (May 24, 1996), http://www.wto.org. The United States brought this
complaint to the WTO rather than NAFTA allegedly because, under NAFTA, Canada could have invoked a "cultural exception" that is unavailable under WTO rules.
See WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997), http://www.wto.org; WTO Dispute Panel Report, Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14,
1997), http://www.wto.org.
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forum selection criterion, much depends on whether a defendant
can invoke an SADC defense only before an SADC panel, or
whether a defendant also could invoke the SADC defense before
a WTO panel as between two SADC members. This question
has not yet been answered in WTO jurisprudence. Some commentators state categorically that WTO panels only apply WTO
law and no other rules of international law. 115 Other commentators, including this author, have argued that, although WTO
panels only have jurisdiction to examine WTO claims, in resolving such claims, they may apply laws other than those set forth
in the WTO Agreement, which potentially includes all rules of
international law binding on the disputing parties. 11 6 The
SADC Tribunal has explicitly adopted the latter position." 7
Therefore, this author would permit WTO panels to rely
on a defense set out, for example, in SADC, as long as (1) both
disputing parties have agreed to the SADC norm in question, (2)
this SADC norm prevails over the WTO provision pursuant to
conflict rules set out in the relevant treaties 1 8 or general international law, 119 and (3) this SADC derogation from WTO norms
as between SADC members does not affect other non-SADC
WTO members. 120 As a result, under this line of reasoning,
115. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40
HARv. INT'L L.J. 333 (1999); cf. Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts
of Jurisdictions: The Relationship Between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and
Other Treaties, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1081 (2001) (implying, at times, that non-WTO
provisions can overrule the WTO Agreement).
116. See, e.g., Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 499 (2001); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public InternationalLaw in the WTO: How FarCan We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001).
117. Southern African Development Community Protocol on Tribunal and the
Rules of Procedure Thereof, art. 21(2), at http://www.sadc.int/index.php?lang=
english&path=legalprotocols&page=p tribunal and rules of procedure (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter SADC Protocol on Tribunal] (stating that the Tribunal shall "develop its own Community jurisprudence having regard to applicable
treaties, general principles and rules of public international law and any rules and
principles of the law of States").
118. The SADC Protocol on Trade, though concluded after the WTO treaty in
April 1995, does not explicitly regulate its relationship to the WTO agreements. In
its preamble, the Protocol states the following: "Mindful of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on global trade liberalization."
SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, pmbl.
119. Such as Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, setting
out the lex posterior rule, that is, the general principle that a later treaty prevails
over an earlier one; or the lex specialis principle, pursuant to which a more specific
provision prevails over a more general one. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 30, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 339-40 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
120. Put differently, the SADC modification to WTO rights and obligations as
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trade restrictions could only be justified under non-WTO rules
(e.g. SADC rules), in case these restrictions apply only to the
countries that have agreed to these (SADC) rules. If an SADC
country would impose the restrictions on non-SADC WTO Members, the restrictions would continue to conflict with WTO
1
rules. 12
Conversely, this author also favors SADC panels taking
cognizance of potential defenses only available under WTO rules
in case both disputing parties are bound by those WTO rules.
However, in such a case, it is nonetheless likely that the SADC
provision would prevail over the WTO defense because the
SADC trade rules were concluded later in time, or lex posterior,
and may also be seen as more specific, or lex specialis, as compared to the more general WTO provisions. If so, the SADC violation stands, and the WTO defense would not be available to
the defendant.
If this view were to prevail, all international law potentially
would apply both before SADC and WTO panels, and any conflict of norms then would be decided by explicit treaty provisions
or rules of general international law. Consequently, even if the
claims brought before an SADC panel and a WTO panel differed
(since based on different treaty provisions), the applicable law
would remain the same. Indeed, in that case, before the SADC
panel, the applicable law would be the SADC Protocol on Trade
to the extent it is not overruled by WTO provisions; before the
WTO panel, it would be WTO covered agreements to the extent
they have not been validly overruled by SADC provisions.
In contrast, if the view were upheld that WTO panels could
apply only WTO law and SADC panels only the SADC Protocol
on Trade, irrespective of what the disputing parties have agreed
to elsewhere, then the question of applicable law in terms of
available defenses may become a crucial factor in forum selection. For example, if the SADC Protocol on Trade offers more
possibilities to impose trade restrictions or safeguards than does
the WTO treaty, then a complainant may have a clear incentive
to bring its dispute to the WTO, where there are fewer exceptions, rather than to SADC, where the defendant may have a
better chance of justifying its trade restriction. One potential
between SADC members must meet the conditions set out in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for such modification to be permissible. Id.
art. 41, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 342.
121. See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
87 (2003).
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example where the SADC Protocol on Trade may excuse more
trade restrictions than WTO provisions is in the area of the general exceptions set out in Article 9.122 Article 9 permits measures "necessary to ensure compliance with existing obligations
under international agreements."'123 The general exceptions in
GATT Article XX do not include this authorization. 124 Another
area where SADC potentially may permit more trade restrictions than the WTO agreements is the safeguards regime currently proposed by Mozambique.1 25 If SADC were to permit
safeguards that do not meet normal WTO rules, SADC members
wanting to complain about such safeguards would have a clear
incentive to bring their case before the WTO, not before SADC.
Again, however, if the opposing view, defended by this author, were adopted, and SADC rules offered a defense also before a WTO panel, then bringing this type of safeguards complaint to the WTO, rather than SADC, would not provide the
means to circumvent more lenient SADC safeguard rules that
may exist. In that case, WTO panels would acknowledge and
apply the more lenient SADC safeguard rules and could find
26
that the trade restriction is justified.
E.

WHO CAN INITIATE A COMPLAINT AND AGAINST WHOM?

Only member countries may initiate and defend against a
complaint before both SADC trade panels and WTO panels. 127
Private actors, whether individuals, companies, or nongovernmental organizations, cannot initiate or be forced to de122. SADC Protocol on Trade, supra note 6, art. 9.
123. Id. art. 9(i). This provision could justify, for example, trade restrictions imposed to comply with MEAs. It could also justify measures required by WTO provisions that would otherwise be inconsistent with SADC, although it is difficult to
think of trade restrictions that WTO members must apply pursuant to the WTO
treaty, let alone trade restrictions that WTO members must apply and that would
otherwise breach SADC rules.
124. GATT 1994, supra note 16, art. XX.
125. Proposed Amendments, supra note 94, art. 61.
126. However, WTO panels could do so only in case the SADC Treaty does not
qualify as an agreement explicitly prohibited in Article 11(1)(b) of the WTO Safeguards Agreement, which provides:
[A] Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on
the export or the import side. These include actions taken by a single
member as well as actions under agreements, arrangements and understandings entered into by two or more Members.
Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 16, art. 11(1)(b).
127. DSU, supra note 9, arts. 1, 3; Annex VI, supra note 8, arts. 1, 3.
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fend against complaints. 28
Yet, private actors may play a role in choosing between the
SADC Tribunal and an SADC trade panel. The SADC Tribunal
not only has jurisdiction over disputes between SADC members,
but also over disputes between (1) "natural or legal persons and
States,"'129 and (2) "natural or legal persons and the [SADC]
Community." 130 The SADC Tribunal is also competent to (1)
"give advisory opinions on such matters as the Summit or the
Council may refer to it;"131 (2) "give preliminary rulings in proceedings of any kind and between any parties before the courts
or tribunals of States;" 132 and (3) take interim measures, includ133
ing "the suspension of an act challenged before the Tribunal."'
Neither WTO panels nor SADC trade panels have this authority
to give advisory opinions, preliminary rulings, or to take interim
measures. All of these features may lead a complainant to prefer the SADC Tribunal to WTO and SADC trade panels.
F.

PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGES

Another reason to prefer a certain forum to another may be
the rules of procedure applied by the respective tribunals.
SADC panel procedures are largely based on those of WTO panels. 134 Nonetheless, some differences can be found. First, before
35
a WTO panel, parties have a right to at least two hearings;
before an SADC panel, parties have a right to at least one hearing. 13 6 Second, in order to be a third party before a WTO panel,
a "substantial interest" is required, which in practice has included a systemic interest, not necessarily based on trade
13 7
floWS;
in order to be a third party before an SADC panel, a
"substantial trade interest" is required. 138 Third, a third party
before a WTO panel only receives the first submissions of the
disputing parties, not the rebuttal submissions; in addition,
there is a special session for the third party to present its views
after the first meeting, but it is not allowed to attend either the
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

DSU, supranote 9, arts. 1, 3; Annex VI, supra note 8, arts. 1, 3.
SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 117, art. 15(1).
Id. art. 18.
SADC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 16(4), 32 I.L.M. at 129.
SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 117, art. 16(1).
Id. art. 28.
Compare DSU, supra note 9, with Annex VI, supra note 8.
DSU, supra note 9, app. 3, para. 7.
Annex VI, supra note 8,art. 10(a).
DSU, supra note 9, art. 10(2).
Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 12.
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first or the second meetings. 139 In contrast, third parties before
an SADC panel have more rights: they "shall have an opportunity to attend all hearings, to make written and oral submissions to the panel and to receive the written submissions of the
disputing Member States." 140 Fourth, an SADC panel is given
only 120 days to submit its final report to the disputing parties,
counting from the date of selection of the last panelist, unless
the parties agree otherwise; 141 a WTO panel is given more time,
namely six months. 142 The WTO panel's deadline is only a "general rule."143 The only strict deadline is set at nine months be-

tween the establishment of the panel (a date that may come well
before the panel selection) and the circulation of the report to all
WTO Members (a date that usually falls one month after the issuance of the report to the disputing parties). 144 Finally, an
SADC panel report is to be adopted within fifteen days after its
circulation to the CMT;'4 5 a WTO panel is to be adopted within
46
sixty days after its circulation to all WTO Members.
In sum, SADC procedures are likely to be faster than those
at the WTO. Initially, this may seem like an advantage, especially to the complainant. Nonetheless, WTO experience has
shown that even the longer WTO deadlines are very difficult to
meet if one expects high quality rulings. 147 Moreover, developing countries are more likely to request more, rather than less,
time to prepare and plead their cases. Therefore, the very strict
timelines in SADC may be more of a disadvantage than an advantage, even for complainants, and especially for least developed member countries.
G.

SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

In addition to special provisions for developing countries,
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism also includes preferen-

139. DSU, supra note 9, arts. 10(2)-(3), app. 3, para. 6.
140. Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 12.
141. Id. arts. 14(2), 15(1).
142. DSU, supranote 9, art. 12(8).
143. Id.
144. Id. art. 12(9).
145. Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 15(4).
146. DSU, supra note 9, art. 16(4).
147. See WorldTradeLaw.net, Time Between Panel Establishment and Adoption
of Panel/AppellateBody Reports, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/
adoptiontimingl.asp (subscription site) (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
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tial treatment for least-developed countries. 148 The SADC
mechanism offers no such preferential treatment. This may
provide an incentive for SADC members that are not leastdeveloped to submit their complaint against least-developed
SADC members to an SADC panel, instead of a WTO panel. In
turn, this feature may influence least developed SADC members
to bring their disputes to the WTO instead of SADC.
The special treatment given to least-developed WTO members is set out in Article 24 of the DSU. It takes the following
four forms: (1) at all stages, "particular consideration shall be
given to the special situation of least-developed country Members;" 149 (2) when considering a complaint against a least-

developed country member, "due restraint" must be exercised; 150
(3) in case a least-developed country is found to be in breach,
complainants must exercise "due restraint in asking for compensation or seeking authorization to suspend" concessions; 151
(4) in all disputes involving a least-developed country, the leastdeveloped country has a right to obtain the good offices, conciliation, and mediation of the Director-General of the WTO or the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body (in other disputes
1 52
this can be obtained only when both parties agree).
So far, not a single WTO complaint has been filed against a
least-developed WTO Member. Nor has a least-developed country ever filed a DSU complaint. However, some least-developed
countries, such as Haiti and Senegal, have been involved in
1 53
WTO dispute settlements as third parties.
H.

POSSIBILITY TO APPEAL

An important, systemic difference between a WTO panel
and an SADC panel is that a WTO panel report is appealable to
the WTO Appellate Body. 15 4 In contrast, SADC panel reports
are not subject to appeal. 155 The creation of the WTO Appellate
148. DSU, supra note 9, art. 24.
149. Id. art. 24(1).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. art. 24(2).
153. For instance, Haiti was a third party in the WTO Dispute Panel on Bananas. See Bananas, supra note 21. Senegal was also a third party in the Bananas
Dispute Panel, as well as the Shrimp Dispute Panel. Id.; WTO Dispute Settlement
Body Constitution of the Panel, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/9 (Apr. 17, 1997), http://www.wto.org.
154. DSU, supra note 9, art. 17.
155. Uncertainty remains as to whether the SADC Tribunal could entertain an

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 13:2

Body in 1995 has made the WTO mechanism more formal, detailed, and legally rigorous. 156 When panels know that their
findings are appealable, they tend to rule more carefully and in
more detail, and they tend to rely more heavily on the treaties/agreements at issue. Such characteristics benefit the system as better reasoned rulings based closely on the parties' intentions as expressed in the treaty text are likely to carry
greater legitimacy, and are likely to make the outcome in future
cases more predictable. Nevertheless, the downside with an appeals process is that the procedure takes more time. However,
at the aggregate level, the WTO's appeals process is likely to be
seen as an advantage and may prompt SADC members to bring
their case to the WTO instead of SADC.
I.

WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE REMEDIES?

If a measure is found to be inconsistent with WTO rules,
the wrongdoing WTO member must bring its measure into conformity at some future time, but normally it does not have to
compensate for damage caused in the past. 157 This is the socalled prospective nature of WTO remedies. 5 In contrast, the
SADC Protocol on Trade seems to imply that SADC panels may
also award damages for past harm. 159 It includes within the
terms of reference of SADC panels the competence to "make
findings, as and when appropriate, on the degree of adverse
trade effects on any Member State of any measure found not to
conform with the provisions of this Protocol or to have caused
nullification or impairment of the complaining Member
State." 160 If this difference were reality, the availability of retappeal against an SADC trade panel. However, given the silence of the SADC
Treaty, the Protocol on Trade, including Annex VI, and the Protocol on Tribunal, on
this subject, it is unlikely that the drafters of these SADC texts intended the SADC
Tribunal to be an appellate organ where panel reports could be challenged. After
all, SADC panel reports must be formally adopted by the CMT within fifteen days,
unless there is a consensus not to adopt them. Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 15(4).
At the same time, the argument could be made that thereby the panel report becomes a CMT decision, and thus a "Community act" subject to challenge before the
SADC Tribunal pursuant to Article 14(b) of the Protocol on Tribunal. SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 117, art. 14(b).
156. James Bacchus, Table Talk: Around the Table of the Appellate Body of the
WTO, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1021, 1033 (2002).

157. DSU, supranote 9, arts. 19, 22(1).
158. Id.
159. Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 9(c).
160. Id. Note also that this panel's competence to make a finding on the degree
of adverse trade effects not only applies in respect of damage caused to the com-
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roactive remedies in SADC, and not in the WTO, would offer a
significant incentive to SADC complainants to bring their case
to SADC instead of the WTO.
J.

WHO Is BOUND BY THE EVENTUAL RULING?

In principle, WTO panel and Appellate Body reports are
binding only on the disputing parties. 16 1 They do not bind any

other WTO members, not even those that were third parties in
the dispute. 162 SADC rules are less explicit, but the general
principle of international law that adjudication as between two
countries binds only those two countries would seem to apply in
1 63
respect of SADC panel reports as well.
That being said, it is clear from practice that WTO panels
and the Appellate Body cite to earlier reports, which have been
adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (albeit by socalled negative consensus). 164 The rulings of the Appellate Body
in particular carry a certain precedential value because, unlike
panels, which are constituted ad hoc for each dispute, members
of the Appellate Body serve for at least four, and normally eight,
years. 165 Therefore, the Appellate Body is unlikely to change its
mind, and at present has never explicitly overruled one of its
earlier decisions. As a result-although WTO reports are binding only on the disputing parties-in practice they can be relied
upon also by other WTO members in future complaints. The
same likely would be true in SADC, although its absence of an
Appellate Body might make the precedential value of adopted
SADC panel reports less predictable.
The added importance of this precedential value given to
WTO Appellate Body reports as amongst the wider pool of WTO
members is that it may make the WTO system more attractive,
especially for SADC defendants. Indeed, if they could convince

plainant but to "any Member State" of SADC. Id.
161. DSU, supra note 9, arts. 3(2), 3(4), 19(2).
162. Id. art. 3(2), 19(2) (stating, "recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements"); see also WTO Agreement, supra note 111, art. IX(2) (stating, "[t]he Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements").
163. As expressed in Article 59 of the I.C.J. Statute, "[tlhe decision of the Court
has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular
case." I.C.J. Statute, supra note 52, art. 59, 55 Stat. at 1062.
164. See Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in
WTO Adjudication, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 873, 879 (2001).
165. DSU, supra note 9, art. 17(2).
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a WTO panel, and even more so the Appellate Body, that their
measures were consistent with WTO rules, such convincing,
practically speaking, would affect all WTO members. In contrast, if they could convince an SADC panel of the legality of
their measure, nothing would stop a non-SADC WTO member
from challenging the same measure before the WTO. This risk
of procedural duplication would exist even if one were to make
SADC the exclusive forum to settle trade disputes as between
SADC members. Indeed, the duplication would be caused not by
SADC members, but by non-SADC WTO members.
Finally, the broader precedential value of WTO Appellate
Body reports may also be attractive to complainants,at least in
the event they win their case. If this happens, the Appellate
Body ruling becomes precedent not only against fellow SADC
members, but also more broadly against all WTO members, including the world's leading non-SADC trading nations.
K.

WHAT HAPPENS IN THE EVENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE?

Both SADC and WTO procedures require a non-compliant
measure to be brought into conformity within a reasonable
time. 166 If the wrongdoing party fails to comply, the parties can
agree on compensation, and, if this fails as well, the complaining
party can be authorized to retaliate. 167 The advantage of such
procedures at the WTO is that because of the broader membership of the WTO, more pressure may be exerted on the wrongdoing SADC state to bring its measure into compliance with WTO
rules. For instance, WTO members exerting such pressure may
include developed countries that are major donors to the defendant SADC member. This feature may convince an SADC
member to bring its complaint against another SADC member
to the WTO instead of SADC.
On the other hand, an SADC member may choose to bring
its dispute to an SADC panel because SADC's maximum "reasonable period of time" for implementation of a measure is six
months. 168
In contrast, compliance with a WTO measure
"should" not exceed fifteen months, but it may be shorter or
longer, depending on the circumstances. 169 This stricter deadline could make the SADC regime attractive to complainants
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. art. 21; Annex VI, supranote 8, art. 17.
DSU, supra note 9, art. 22; Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 18.
Annex VI, supra note 8, art. 17.
DSU, supra note 9, art. 21(4).
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who are eager to obtain implementation as quickly as possible.
L.

CONCLUSION OF PART II

It is difficult to make a general conclusion as to whether the
WTO or the SADC is the better, or more appropriate, forum to
resolve trade disputes as between SADC members. Some factors weigh in favor of the WTO, others in favor of SADC, and
even one factor may militate in favor of SADC or the WTO depending on the perspective one takes. The table below summarizes the discussion in Part II.
Table 2
SADC Dispute Settlement Compared to WTO Dispute
Settlement

SADC
Cost of litigation

Organizational
context

Who decides?

Applicable law

Borne by the disputing parties

WTO

Borne by the WTO
budget
(adjudication) and the disputing parties (litigation)
Advisory Center on
WTO Law
Regional (local reso- Global (more preslution, among like- sure on defendant;
minded states)
defendant
may
avoid repeat litigation)
Panelists: local and Panelists: few Afriselected by the par- cans; nominated by
ties
Secretariat;
Standing Appellate
Body
Since SADC is to In
cases
where
become free trade SADC
rules
are
area, SADC rules more lenient, an
are likely to be open question restricter (with possi- mains whether a
ble exceptions such SADC defense can
as broader
safe- be invoked before a
guards under nego- WTO panel
tiation)

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 13:2

Who can initiate/be
sued?

Member countries
only
Note: SADC Tribunal has wider jurisdiction,
including
standing for private
parties, and against
SADC acts

Procedures

Faster (fewer hearings; shorter panel
time and implementation period); third
parties have more
rights
No special treat- Preferential
ment
ment
for
developed

Least-developed
countries

Member
only

countries

treatleastWTO

members

Possibility
peal

to

ap-

No appeal

Appeal before the
WTO
Appellate
Body

Remedies
Binding effect

Non-compliance

Potentially also retroactive remedies
Binding only on the
disputing parties

Voluntary compensation, plus retaliation

Prospective remedies only
Binding only on the
disputing parties;
but with standing
Appellate Body de
facto rule of precedent, as between
larger number of
countries than at
SADC
Same as SADC;
however,
given
broader WTO membership, more political pressure to
comply

Leaving aside the specific provisions in SADC and WTO
treaties, a good case can be made that trade disputes between
SADC members ought to be resolved at the SADC level, as it
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seems unnecessary to globalize a regional dispute. Moreover,
since SADC is to become a free trade area, SADC rights and obligations are likely to be stricter and more specific, which ar170
guably suggests that disputes should be resolved at SADC.
Nonetheless, a number of factors favor the WTO, including (1)
cost of litigation, which is borne largely by the WTO budget and
the Advisory Center on WTO Law; (2) the more neutral selection
of panelists and the possibility to appeal; (3) preferential treatment for least-developed countries; and (4) the larger WTO
membership, a feature that may put more political pressure on
the parties to resolve the dispute, create broader precedents,
and avoid duplication of litigation against a single measure.
However, this risk of duplication is mitigated by the facts that
(1) if a defendant wins under SADC, where rules are likely to be
stricter, it is likely to win also at the WTO; and (2) if a defendant loses under SADC, then it must change its regime and it
may as well do so in a way that complies with both its SADC
and its WTO obligations.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF LAW
Part I explained the potential overlap between different international courts or tribunals that decide trade-related disputes between SADC members. Part II summarized the factors
that parties may consider relevant in selecting one court or tribunal over another. Part III will survey how other international
regimes have regulated the problem of jurisdictional overlap.
Section A addresses other regional treaties that established
a customs union or other form of relatively closely integrated
regional community. Section B looks at a selection of more
loosely integrated free trade agreements (FTAs), be they regional or bilateral. Section C offers some examples set out in
universal treaties. The objective in mind is not to offer an exhaustive treatment of this topic, but rather to mention the major regional arrangements and some bilateral trade agreements
that contain explicit provisions on jurisdictional overlap. It is
interesting to note that none of the treaties concluded on the African continent discussed supra-SACU, COMESA, ECCAS,
EAC, African Economic Community, or African Unionexplicitly address the issue of overlap.
170.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Part III concludes in Section D with an elaboration of the
general principles of law that international courts and tribunals
may apply to resolve problems of jurisdictional overlap in case
no explicit conflict clauses are set out in the relevant treaties.
A. TREATY PROVISIONS IN CUSTOMS UNIONS AND REGIONAL
"COMMUNITIES"

1. Treaty Establishingthe European Community (EC Treaty)
(1957)
The EC Treaty deals with the question of jurisdictional
overlap as follows: "Member States undertake not to submit a
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this
Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided
therein." 171 The EC Treaty provides for a Court of First Instance and a European Court of Justice.172 To some extent, the
SADC Tribunal is based on the model of the European Court of
Justice. SADC trade panels and WTO panels, on the other
hand, are based on a different model: they are exclusively intergovernmental in nature, ad hoc, and have jurisdiction only over
disputes as between States. The EC Treaty reserves exclusive
jurisdiction to the EC courts for the settlement of all disputes as
between EU members falling under EC treaties including all of
173
their trade disputes.
The tension between EC courts and other international tribunals materialized most recently in the MOX Plant case. 174 In
that dispute, Ireland submitted claims of violation under
UNCLOS concerning discharges into the Irish sea of radioactive
waste by a new processing plant (the MOX plant) set up by the
United Kingdom close to the Irish border. 175 In an Order on
Provisional Measures dated December 3, 2001, the ITLOS found
that there was prima facie jurisdiction under Article 288(1) of

171.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 292,

O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
172. Id. arts. 220, 225.
173. Id. art. 292.
174. See Case 10, Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of the Case
of Ireland in the Dispute Concerning the MOX Plant, International Movements of
Radioactive Materials, and the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Irish
Sea, (Ir. v. U.K) (Nov. 9, 2001), at http://www.itlos.org/start2-en.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2004).
175. Id. paras. 5-8.
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UNCLOS. 176 In contrast, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted subsequently under Annex VII of UNCLOS decided, on the merits
of the case, to suspend its proceedings by Order of June 24,
2003.177 It did so in response mainly to arguments by the
United Kingdom that the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of EC courts pursuant to Article 292 of the EC
Treaty. 178 The Arbitral Tribunal was of the view that the question of whether and what aspects of the UNCLOS dispute fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction and competence of the EC is a
question "to be decided within the institutions of the European
Communities, and particularly by the European Court of Justice". 179 Hence, the Arbitral Tribunal considered it inappropriate to continue its proceedings "in the absence of a resolution of
the problems referred to" within the context of the EC.18 0 Interestingly, the Order did so "bearing in mind considerations of
mutual respect and comity which should prevail between judicial institutions both of which may be called upon to determine
rights and obligations as between two States," and noted that "a
procedure that might result in two conflicting decisions on the
same issue would not be helpful to the resolution of the dispute
between the Parties."1'8
2. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Andean
Community (CartagenaAgreement) (1996)
The Cartagena Agreement, which established the Andean
Community, provides that "[m]ember countries shall not submit
any dispute that may arise from the application of provisions
comprising the legal system of the Andean Community to any
court, arbitration system or proceeding whatsoever except for

176. Case 10, Order 3/2001, The MOX Plant Case, Request for Provisional
Measures (Ir. v. U.K.) (Dec. 3, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 405, 411 at http://www.itlos.org (last
visited Dec. 2, 2003).
177. The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), 42 I.L.M. 1187, 1191 (ITLOS Permanent
Court of Arbitration), availableat http://www.pca-cpa.orgPDF/MOX%200rder%
20no3.pdf (last visited Dec. 2 2003).
178. Id. at 1190-91.
179. Id. at 1191. The European Commission actually initiated infringement
procedures under the EC Treaty against Ireland claiming that Ireland's initiation of
the MOX Plant case under UNCLOS (as well as the OSPAR Convention) violates
Ireland's obligations under the EC Treaty. See Severin Carrell, Ireland Threatened
over Sellafield Row, INDEP. (London), June 29, 2003, at 1.
180. The MOX Plant Case, 42 I.L.M. at 1191.
181. Id.
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those stipulated in this Treaty." 18 2 This provision is similar to
Article 292 of the EC Treaty.1 83 The Court of Justice of the Andean Community is comparable to the European Court of Justice and the SADC Tribunal.
3.

SADC Tribunal

The SADC Tribunal provides for "exclusive jurisdiction over
all disputes between the States and the Community,"18 4 "exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between natural or legal persons
and the Community," 18 5 and "exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes between the Community and its staff."18 6 The Tribunal's
jurisdiction "over disputes between States, and between natural
or legal persons and States" is not stated to be exclusive.1 8 7
4.

CaribbeanCourt of Justice

In 1999, the members of the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), which includes fifteen Caribbean countries from
the Bahamas to Suriname, signed the Agreement Establishing
the Caribbean Court of Justice.18 8 This Agreement provides:
Subject to the Treaty, the Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and deliver judgment on:
(a) disputes between Contracting Parties to this Agreement;
(b) disputes between any Contracting Parties to this Agreement and
the Community;
(c) referrals from national courts or tribunals of Contracting Parties to
this Agreement;
(d) applications by nationals in accordance with Article XXIV, concern-

182. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, May 28,
1996, art. 42(1), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/trea/
andetrie2.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement]. The
Andean Community is made up of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
Id. pmbl.
183. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
184. SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 117, art. 17.
185. Id. art. 18.
186. Id. art. 19.
187. Id. art. 15(1).

188.

Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, Feb. 14, 2001,

availableat http://www.caricom.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
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ing the interpretation and application of the Treaty.

5.

189

European Economic Area (EEA)

The EEA Agreement is a free trade agreement concluded
between the member States of the European Community and
the member States of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), excluding Switzerland. 190 The original EEA Agreement
envisaged the creation of an EEA Court. 191 However, in a 1991
opinion, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found that the
creation of an independent EEA Court would be incompatible
with the EC Treaty and its own competencies. 192 In response to
this opinion, in February 1992, the EFTA Court was created,
having jurisdiction only over EFTA States, and additional provisions were added to the EEA Agreement to ensure further legal
homogeneity between the EFTA Court and the ECJ.193
For present purposes, the EEA Agreement's provisions on
homogeneity are particularly important. In the EEA Agreement, which incorporates many EC provisions, the objective is
to "arrive at as uniform an interpretation as possible of the provisions of the [EEA] Agreement and those provisions of Community legislation which are substantially reproduced in the
[EEA] Agreement." 194 A similar problem of consistency may
arise as between interpretations of WTO rules by WTO panels
and the Appellate Body, on the one hand, and interpretations of
WTO rules as incorporated in the SADC Protocol on Trade by
SADC trade panels, on the other.
To achieve homogeneity between interpretations by the ECJ
and the EFTA Court, the following provisions are made:
The EEA Joint Committee shall keep under constant review the development of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the EFTA Court. To this end judgments of these Courts
shall be transmitted to the EEA Joint Committee which shall act so as

189. Id. art. XII(1).
190. See generally Agreement on the European Economic Area, May 2, 1992,
1994 O.J. (L 1) 3 [hereinafter EEA Agreement].
191. See John Forman, The EEA Agreement Five Years On: Dynamic Homogeneity in Practiceand its Implementation by the Two EEA Courts, COMMON MKT. L. R.
751, 752 (1999).
192. Opinion 1/91, Opinion Delivered Pursuant to the Second Paragraph of Article 228(1) of the Treaty, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079 (1991).
193. See Forman, supra note 191, at 752.
194. EEA Agreement, supra note 190, art. 105(1).
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19 5

In order to ensure as uniform an interpretation as possible of this
Agreement, in full deference to the independence of courts, a system of
exchange of information concerning judgments by the EFTA Court, the
Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities and the Courts of last instance
19 6
of the EFTA States shall be set up by the EEA Joint Committee.

In respect of disputes between the EC and EFTA States, the
197
EEA Joint Committee first shall try to resolve the dispute.
However, in those cases as well, the ECJ can get involved:
If a dispute concerns the interpretation of provisions of this Agreement, which are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and to
acts adopted in application of these two Treaties and if the dispute has
not been settled within three months after it has been brought before
the EEA Joint Committee, the Contracting Parties to the dispute may
agree to request the Court of Justice of the European Communities to
1 98
give a ruling on the interpretation of the relevant rules.

6.

Olivos Protocol (MERCOSUR)

The Olivos Protocol 99 is the dispute settlement mechanism
set up within MERCOSUR, a customs union formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 200 Dispute settlement in
MERCOSUR, like the SADC trade panel system, is based on
WTO dispute settlement. 201 MERCOSUR panels, or "Ad Hoc
Arbitration Courts," can be reviewed by the Permanent Review
Court. 20 2 Parties can also "agree expressly to submit directly
and in a single instance to the Permanent Review Court. In
that case, the Court shall have the same jurisdiction as the Ad
203
Hoc Arbitration Court".
Concerning the relationship between MERCOSUR and
195. Id. art. 105(2).
196. Id. art. 106(1).
197. See id. arts. 92-94.
198. Id. art. 111(3).
199. Olivos Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in MERCOSUR, Feb. 18,
2002, art. 1(2), available at http://www.mercosul.gov.br/textos/default.asp?Key=232
(last visited Nov. 21, 2003) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Olivos Protocol].
200. See generally Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1041.
201. See supra Part I.A.1.
202. Olivos Protocol, supra note 199, art. 17(1).
203. Id. art. 23(1).
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WTO dispute settlement, Article 1(2) of the Olivos Protocol pro-

vides as follows:
Disputes falling within the scope of application of this Protocol that
may also be referred to the dispute settlement system of the World
Trade Organisation or other preferential trade systems that the Mercosur State Parties may have entered into, may be referred to one forum or the other, as decided by the requesting party. Provided, however, that the parties to the dispute may jointly agree on a forum.
Once a dispute settlement procedure pursuant to the preceding paragraph has begun, none of the parties may request the use of the mechanisms204
established in the other fora, as defined by Article 14 of this Protocol.

In other words, the complainant chooses the choice of forum, but once it makes a choice, it is to the exclusion of the
other forum. For present purposes, the question arises, for example, what a WTO panel should do in case a WTO member
first pursues its complaint under MERCOSUR and thereafter
re-submits it to the WTO, in violation of the MERCOSUR exclusion provision referred to above. This type of situation arose recently before the WTO Dispute Panel on Anti-Dumping Duties
on Poultry from Brazil. 20 5 In that dispute, Brazil invoked WTO
dispute settlement procedures after it had unsuccessfully relied
206
on MERCOSUR arbitration.
B.

TREATY PROVISIONS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

1.

NAFTA

Chapter 20 of NAFTA includes provisions relating to the
avoidance or settlement of all disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the NAFTA agreement, except for matters
covered in Chapter 11 (Investment), Chapter 14 (Financial Services) and Chapter 19 (Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
2
final determinations). 07
Article 2005 of NAFTA explicitly regulates the relation204. Id. art. 1(2) (emphasis added).
205. WTO Dispute Panel Report, Argentina-DefinitiveAnti-Dumping Duties on
Poultry from Brazil, WTDS241/R (Apr. 22, 2003), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter
Brazil Poultry]. This decision was not appealed.
206. Id. para. 2.10. A MERCOSUR arbitration panel had rejected Brazil's
claims of violation in respect of the very same anti-dumping measure imposed by
Argentina. Id.; see also infra Part III.D.
207. See generally NAFTA, supra note 111.
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ship between NAFTA and WTO dispute settlement. 208 In sum208.

Id. art. 2005, 32 I.L.M. at 694. That Article provides:

1. Subject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, disputes regarding any matter arising
under both this Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, any agreement negotiated thereunder, or any successor agreement
(GATT), may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining
Party.
2. Before a Party initiates a dispute settlement proceeding in the GATT
against another Party on grounds that are substantially equivalent to
those available to that Party under this Agreement, that Party shall notify
any third Party of its intention. If a third Party wishes to have recourse to
dispute settlement procedures under this Agreement regarding the matter,
it shall inform promptly the notifying Party and those Parties shall consult
with a view to agreement on a single forum. If those Parties cannot agree,
the dispute normally shall be settled under this Agreement.
3. In any dispute referred to in paragraph 1 where the responding Party
claims that its action is subject to Article 104 (Relation to Environmental
and Conservation Agreements) and requests in writing that the matter be
considered under this Agreement, the complaining Party may, in respect of
that matter, thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely
under this Agreement.
4. In any dispute referred to in paragraph I that arises under Section B of
Chapter Seven (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) or Chapter Nine
(Standards-Related Measures):
(a) concerning a measure adopted or maintained by a Party to protect its
human, animal or plant life or health, or to protect its environment, and
(b) that raises factual issues concerning the environment, health, safety or
conservation, including directly related scientific matters,
where the responding Party requests in writing that the matter be considered under this Agreement, the complaining Party may, in respect of that
matter, thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely under this Agreement.
5. The responding Party shall deliver a copy of a request made pursuant to
paragraph 3 or 4 to the other Parties and to its Section of the Secretariat.
Where the complaining Party has initiated dispute settlement proceedings
regarding any matter subject to paragraph 3 or 4, the responding Party
shall deliver its request no later than 15 days thereafter. On receipt of such
request, the complaining Party shall promptly withdraw from participation
in those proceedings and may initiate dispute settlement procedures under
Article 2007.
6. Once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated under Article
2007 or dispute settlement proceedings have been initiated under the
GATT, the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the other, unless a
Party makes a request pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4.
7. For purposes of this Article, dispute settlement proceedings under the
GATT are deemed to be initiated by a Party's request for a panel, such as
under Article XXIII:2 of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947,
or for a committee investigation, such as under Article 20.1 of the Customs
Valuation Code.
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mary, where a dispute regards a matter arising under both
NAFTA and the WTO, in principle, the choice of forum is left to
the discretion of the complaining party. 20 9 However, for certain
types of disputes, such as those related to environmental or
health protection, the defendant can insist that the dispute be
decided under NAFTA.210 However, once a forum is chosen, it
must be used to the exclusion of all others. 211 Many free trade
agreements have established similar rules on the relationship
2 12
with WTO dispute settlement.
2. Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Dispute settlement in ASEAN, like the SADC trade panel
system, is based on WTO dispute settlement. 213 ASEAN panel
reports are to be adopted by the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) by simple majority. 2 14 However, this ruling is appealable to the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM),215 and "[tihe
decision of the AEM on the appeal shall be final and binding on
all parties to the dispute."216 The ASEAN Protocol on dispute
Id. (emphasis added).
209. Id. art. 2005, para. 1, 32 I.L.M at 694.
210. Id. art. 2005, paras. 3-5, 32 I.L.M at 694.
211. Id. art. 2005, para. 6, 32 I.L.M at 694.
212. See, e.g., Can.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 2, 1997, Can.-Chile, art.
N-18, at http://www.sice.oas.org; Can.-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 23,
2001, Can.-Costa Rica, art. XIII(6), at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca; Chile-Mex. Free Trade
Agreement, Apr. 17, 1998, Chile-Mex., art. 18-03, at http://www.sice.oas.org; Mex.Northern Triangle Free Trade Agreement, June 29, 2000, art. 19-03, at
http://www.sice.oas.org. For examples of dispute settlement provisions similar to
NAFTA art. 2005, see U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile,
ch. 22, at http://www.sice.oas.org; U.S.-Sing. Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003,
U.S.-Sing., at http://www.sice.oas.org. See also, e.g. Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Compagnie Generale des Eaux v. Argentine Republic, 40 I.L.M. 426
(Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes 2001); In re Annulment Proceeding in the
Arbitration between Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v.
Argentine Republic, paras. 55, 60, 113, 41 I.L.M. 1135 (Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of
Inv. Disputes 2002) (illustrating the so-called "fork in the road" provision in many
bilateral investment treaties, offering a choice to investors either to submit disputes
to the domestic courts of the host State or international arbitration, but stating explicitly that once an avenue is chosen, it is to the exclusion of the other). See infra
note 273.
213. See generally Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Nov. 20, 1996,
available at http://www.aseansec.org/12814.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003) [hereinafter ASEAN Protocol].
214. Id. art. 7.
215. Id. art. 8.
216. Id. art. 8(2).
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settlement addresses overlaps as follows:
The provisions of this Protocol are without prejudice to the
rights of Member States to seek recourse to other fora for the settlement of disputes involving other Member States. A Member
State involved in a dispute can resort to other fora at any stage
before the Senior Economic Officials Meeting ("SEOM") has
made a ruling on the panel report. 2 17
3.

Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA)

The third draft agreement on an FTAA, dated November 21,
2003, includes the following Article 8, entitled "Choice of Fo218
rum" (bracketed text is still under negotiation):
8.1. Disputes within the scope of application of this Chapter that are
also eligible for submission to the dispute settlement system of the
World Trade Organization [or that of a regional agreement to which
the Parties to the dispute are Party,] may be submitted to any of these

fora, at the discretionof the complainingParty.
8.2. Once a Party has initiated dispute settlement proceedings under
this Agreement or the Understanding [or a regional agreement], that

Party shall not initiate dispute settlement proceedings in any other fora
with respect to the same [claim on] [actual or proposed] [measure] [or]
2 19
[matter].

217. Id. art. 3(3) (emphasis added).
218. See Third Draft Free Trade Area of the Americas Agreement, Nov. 21,
2003, availableat http://ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index-e.asp (last visited Dec. 3,
2003).
219. Id. art. 8 (emphasis added). Draft Article 8 continues as follows:
8.3. [Before a Party initiates a dispute settlement proceeding under the
WTO Agreement [or any regional agreement to which the Parties to the
dispute are Party] against another Party, [involving a matter which could
also be filed in accordance with the FTAA's dispute settlement procedure,]
the following rules shall apply:
a) the complaining Party shall notify the Parties to this Agreement of its
intention to do so; and
[b) if there are multiple complainants regarding the same matter, they
shall endeavor to agree on a single forum] .]
8.4. For the purposes of this Article, dispute settlement proceedings are
deemed to be initiated:
a) under the WTO Agreement, when [a Party requests the establishment of
a panel] [a panel is established] under Article 6 of the Understanding;
b) under this Agreement, when [a Party requests the establishment of a
neutral panel] [a neutral panel is established] under Article 11 (Establishment of a Neutral Panel)];
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US-Israel Free Trade Agreement

The US-Israel FTA provides that "if the conciliation panel
under this Agreement or any other applicable international dispute settlement mechanism has been invoked by either Party
with respect to any matter, the mechanism invoked shall have
220
exclusive jurisdiction over that matter."
5. Free Trade Agreement between the European Community
and South Africa
The Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and the Republic of South Africa aims at the creation of a free trade area between the two
parties. 221 The Agreement provides for dispute settlement by
means of ad hoc arbitration. 222 Article 104(10) of the Agreement
addresses the relationship between this bilateral arbitration
mechanism and the WTO dispute settlement as follows:
Without prejudice to their right to have recourse to WTO dispute settlement procedures, the Community and South Africa shall endeavour
to settle disputes relating to specific obligations arising under Titles II
[on Trade] and III [on Trade-related Issues] of this Agreement through
recourse to the specific dispute settlement provisions of this Agreement.
Arbitration proceedings established under this Agreement will not
consider issues relating to each Party's WTO rights and obligations,
223
unless the Parties agree to refer any such issues to the arbitration.

6. Agreement between New Zealand and Singaporeon a Closer
Economic Relationship (ANZSCEP)
Disputes under ANZSCEP are to be resolved by arbitral tribunals. 224 The agreement provides that the rules and proce-

[c) under a regional agreement, when the requirements provided for a
panel or similar adjudicative body under such agreement are met.]
Id.
220. U.S.-Isr. Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, art. 19(f), 24 I.L.M. 653,
665.
221. Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European
Community and Its Member States, on the One Part, and the Republic of South Africa on the Other, Dec. 4, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 311) 3.
222. Id. art. 104, 1999 O.J. (L 311) at 44.
223. Id. art. 104(10), 1999 O.J. (L 311) at 44 (emphasis added).
224. See Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic
Partnership, Nov. 14, 2000, N.Z.-Sing., at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/
sea/cepsingdocs/singcepcontent.html [hereinafter ANZSCEP].
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dures on dispute settlement in ANZSCEP "are without prejudice
to the rights of the Parties to have recourse to dispute settlement
procedures available under other agreements to which they are
party."

7.

225

EC-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
The EC-Mexico free trade agreement provides that:
3. Arbitration proceedings established under this Title will not consider issues relating to each Party's rights and obligations under the
Agreement establishing the [WTO].
4. Recourse to the dispute settlement provisions of this Title shall be
without prejudice to any possible action in the WTO framework, including dispute settlement action. However, where a Party has, with regard to a particular matter, instituted a dispute settlement proceeding
under either Article 43(1) of this Title or the WTO Agreement, it shall
not institute a dispute settlement proceeding regarding the same matter under the other forum until such time as the first proceeding has
ended. For purposes of this paragraph, dispute settlement proceedings
under the WTO Agreement are deemed to be initiated by a Party's request for a panel under Article 6 of the Understanding on Rules
and
226
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of the WTO.

8. EuropeanFree Trade Association (EFTA)-Mexico Free
Trade Agreement
The EFTA-Mexico FTA deals with jurisdictional overlap in
the following terms:
Choice of forum
1. Subject to paragraph 2, any dispute regarding any matter arising
under both this Agreement and the WTO Agreement, any agreement
negotiated thereunder, or any successor agreement, may be settled in
either forum at the discretionof the complainingParty.
2. Before an EFTA State initiates a dispute settlement proceeding
against Mexico or Mexico initiates a dispute settlement proceeding
against any EFTA State in the WTO on grounds that are substantially
equivalent to those available to the Party concerned under this

225. Id. art. 58(1).
226. Decision 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council, March 23, 2000, art. 47,
2000 O.J. (L 157) 10, 27.
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Agreement, that Party shall notify the other Parties of its intention. If
another Party wishes also to have recourse to dispute settlement procedures as a complainant under this Agreement regarding the same
matter, it shall inform promptly the notifying Party and those Parties
shall consult with a view to agreement on a single forum. If those Parties cannot agree, the dispute shall be settled under this Agreement.
3. Once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated under this
Agreement pursuant to Article 73 or dispute settlement proceedings
have been initiated under the WTO Agreement, the forum selected
shall be used to the exclusion of the other.
4. For the purposes of this Article, dispute settlement proceedings under the WTO Agreement are deemed to be initiated by a Party's request for the establishment of a panel,
such as under Article 6 of the
227
Dispute Settlement Understanding.

9. Japan-SingaporeEconomic PartnershipAgreement
(JSEPA)
The Japan-Singapore FTA sets out the following dispute
settlement rules:
This Chapter shall apply with respect to the avoidance and settlement
of disputes between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement or the Implementing Agreement.
Nothing in this Chaptershall prejudice any rightsof the Parties to have
recourse to dispute settlement procedures available under any other international agreement to which they are parties.
Notwithstanding paragraph 2 above, once a dispute settlement procedure has been initiated under this Chapter or under any other international agreement to which the Parties are parties with respect to a
particular dispute, that procedure shall be used to the exclusion of any
other procedure for that particulardispute. However, this does not apply if substantially separate and distinct rights or obligations under
different internationalagreements are in dispute.
Paragraph 3 above shall not apply where the Parties expressly agree
to the use of more than
one dispute settlement procedure in respect of
228
a particular dispute.

227. Free Trade Agreement between the European Free Trade Association
States and the United Mexican States, Nov. 27, 2000, art. 77, available at
http:/secretariat.efta.intWeb/ExternalRelations/PartnerCountriesfMexicoMX/MX_F
TA.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (emphasis added).
228. Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Singapore for a New-Age
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TREATY PROVISIONS IN GLOBAL TREATIES

1. Dispute Settlement Understandingof the World Trade
Organization
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that
"when Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or
other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered
agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective
of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide
"' 229
by, the rules andprocedures of this Understanding.
As one WTO panel noted,
Article 23 of the DSU deals, as its title indicates, with the "Strengthening of the Multilateral System." Its overall design is to prevent WTO
Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO
rights and obligations. It does so by obligating
Members to follow the
230
multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU.

The panel added that Article 23 of the DSU
imposes on all Members to "have recourse to" the multilateral process
set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency.
In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU
dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call "exclusive dispute resolution clause,"
is an important
new element of Members' rights and obligations under
231
the DSU.

In another dispute, the WTO Appellate Body stated:
Article 23(1) of the DSU imposes a general obligation of Members to
redress a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of
benefits under the covered agreements only by recourse to the rules
and procedures of the DSU, and not through unilateral action.... [All
provisions in Article 23] concern the obligation
of Members of the WTO
232
not to have recourse to unilateral action.

Economic Partnership, Jan. 13, 2002, Japan-Sing., art. 77, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/singapore/jsepa.html
[hereinafter JSEPA]
(emphasis added).
229. DSU, supra note 9, art. 23 (emphasis added).
230. WTO Dispute Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act
of 1974, WT/DS152/R, para. 7.35, (Jan. 27, 2000), http://www.wto.org.
231. Id. para. 7.43.
232. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Measures on Certain
Imports from the European Communities, WTJDS165/AB/R, para. 111 (Jan. 10,
2001), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter US-CertainEC Products].
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Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
The ECT 23 3 provides the broadest multilateral framework of

rules in existence under international law governing energy cooperation. It is focused on cooperation between Western European countries and countries formerly belonging to the Soviet
Union. The treaty has important provisions aimed at liberalizing trade in energy. 234 Like the SADC Protocol on Trade, it incorporates large parts of WTO agreements. 235 However, the
trade provisions of the ECT apply only "between Contracting
Parties at least one of which is not a member [of the WTO]"236
and only for as long as "any Contracting Party is not a member
[of the WTO]."237 The treaty also provides that "[nlothing in this
Treaty shall derogate, as between particular [ECT] Contracting
Parties which are [WTO members], from the provisions of [WTO
agreements] as they are applied between those contracting parties."

238

The ECT establishes dispute settlement procedures for
cases of investment-related disputes between an investor and a
Contracting Party,239 and for state-to-state disputes concerning
the application or interpretation of the ECT between Contracting Parties. 240 In addition, there is a more specific mechanism
under the treaty for trade-related disputes between Contracting
Parties, envisaging the application of a panel system along the
lines of WTO dispute settlement procedures. 241 The treaty
specifies that ECT trade panels
shall not question the compatibility with Article 5 or 29 of practices
applied by any Contracting Party which is a [member] to the [WTO] to
other [members of the WTO] to which it applies the [WTO Agreement]
and which have not been taken by those other [members] to dispute
resolution under the [WTO Agreement].242

233. European Energy Charter Treaty, Feb. 1, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 360, available at
http://www.encharter.org/uploadll/TreatyBook-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003)
[hereinafter Energy Charter Treaty].
234. See, e.g., id. art. 6, 34 I.L.M. at 386.
235. See id. art. 29, 34 I.L.M. at 402-03.
236. See id. art. 29(2)(a), 34 I.L.M. at 402.
237. Id. art. 29(1), 34 I.L.M. at 402.
238. Id. art. 4, 34 I.L.M. at 385.
239. See Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 233, art. 26, 34 I.L.M. at 399-400.
240. See id. art. 27, 34 I.L.M. at 401-02.
241. See id. ann. D, 34 I.L.M. at 420-24.
242. See id. ann. D, para. 3(a), 34 I.L.M. at 421-22.
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The general state-to-state dispute settlement system 243 is
delineated from the specific one on trade by Article 28, which
states that "[a] dispute between Contracting Parties with respect to the application or interpretation of Article 5 [on investment] or 29 [relating to trade] shall not be settled under Article
24 4
27 unless the Contracting Parties to the dispute so agree."
The ECT trade mechanism does not apply as between two
ECT parties that are also WTO members. Since ECT trade provisions incorporate a number of WTO provisions, the ECT treaty
provides that ECT trade "[p]anels shall be guided by the interpretations given to the [WTO Agreement] within the framework
of the WTO Agreement." 24 5 The Draft Rules of Procedure for
ECT Panel Proceedings also provides that "[i]n respect of legal
and procedural aspects, the Secretariat may decide to seek the
2
advice of the Secretariat of the WTO." 46
3.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

UNCLOS states the following with respect to the
.'[s]ettlement of disputes by any peaceful means chosen by the
parties": "Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States
Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention
247
by any peaceful means of their own choice."
UNCLOS also provides that:
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed, through a
general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a
procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in
lieu of the proceduresprovided
for in this Part,unless the parties to the
248
dispute otherwise agree.

As noted earlier, UNCLOS provides that state parties are free to
choose, by means of a written declaration, between four methods
for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or

243. See id. art. 27, 34 I.L.M. at 401-02.
244. Id. art. 28, 34 I.L.M. at 402.
245. Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 233, ann. D, para. 3(a), 34 I.L.M. at 42122.
246. Draft Rules of Procedure for Panel Proceedings Related to Article 5 or Article 29 of the Energy Charter Treaty, Rule 11(1), available at http://www.encharter.
org/index.jsp?ptp=tDetail.jsp&pci=21&pti=16 (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
247. UNCLOS, supra note 69, art. 280, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 508, 21 I.L.M. at 1322.
248. Id. art. 282 (emphasis added).
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application of UNCLOS: (1) ITLOS; (2) ICJ; (3) arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS; or (4) special (expert) arbitration

under Annex VIII of UNCLOS.249 To decide which of these four
methods applies in a particular dispute, the following rules apply:
3. A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall be deemed
to have accepted arbitration in accor250
dance with Annex VII.
4. If the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure for the
settlement of the dispute, it may be
submitted only to that procedure,
251
unless the parties otherwise agree.
5. If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for
the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration
252
in accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.

Table 3
The Regulation of Jurisdictional Overlaps in Other

International Regimes
MECHANISM

EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION?

LCUSTOMS UNIONS/
"COMMUNITIES"
European Community
Yes
(Art. 292)
Andean Community
Yes

RELATIONSHIP
WITH
OTHER
FORA

None
None

(Art. 42.1)

SADC Tribunal

249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.

Some jurisdiction
exclusive;
other
not (such as that
for
state-to-state
disputes,
Art.
15.1)

287, 1833 U.N.T.S. at
287(3), 1833 U.N.T.S.
287(4), 1833 U.N.T.S.
287(5), 1833 U.N.T.S.

None

509-10, 21 I.L.M. at 1322-1323.
at 510, 21 I.L.M. at 1323.
at 510, 21 I.L.M. at 1323.
at 510, 21 I.L.M. at 1323.
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MECHANISM

EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION?

Caribbean
Justice

Court

European
Area

Economic

MERCOSUR

of

Yes
(Art. IX(a))
Both
ECJ
and
EFTA Court have
distinct
jurisdiction

No

[Vol. 13:2
RELATIONSHIP
WITH
OTHER
FORA
None

*EFTA Court deals
with EEA EFTA
members; ECJ with
EU members and
EC-EFTA disputes;
*Case law of both
EFTA Court and
ECJ kept under review;
*System
of
exchange of information
*Complainant can
select forum;
*Duplication precluded: once one
procedure
begun,
neither party can
go to other forum
(Art. 1)

2. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
NAFTA
No
*NAFTA or WTO upon discretion
of the complainant;
*Third party can insist on NAFTA;
*Defendant can insist on NAFTA for
certain environmental, health and standard-related disputes
(Art. 2005)
*Duplication precluded: once
either system invoked, other excluded (with exceptions mentioned
earlier)
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MECHANISM
(cont.)
ASEAN

EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION?
No

FTAA

No

US-Israel FTA

No

South AfricaEC FTA

No

RELATIONSHIP
WITH OTHER FORA
*Complainant can choose
between ASEAN and other
fora such as WTO
*Duplication precluded:
once there is a ruling on
ASEAN panel report, other
fora excluded (Art. 3)
*FTAA, WTO [or other
FTA mechanism] upon discretion of the complainant;
* Duplication precluded:
once procedure initiated,
other fora precluded

Duplication precluded:
once a forum invoked, other
fora excluded
(Art. 19(f))
*Parties "shall endeavour"
to settle under FTA,
*but right to go to WTO
mechanism maintained;
*FTA arbitration shall not
consider WTO rights and
obligations unless parties
agree
(Art. 104.10)
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MECHANISM

EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION?

OTHER
PROVISIONS
ON RELATIONSHIP
WITH OTHER FORA

New ZealandSingapore FTA

No

FTA mechanism without
prejudice to other fora (Art.
58.1)

EC-Mexico
FTA

No

*choice between FTA and
WTO mechanism;
*once a forum selected,

EFTA-Mexico
FTA

No

JapanSingapore FTA

No

cannot go to other forum
until the first procedure has
ended;
*FTA arbitration shall not
consider WTO rights and
obligations (Art. 47.4)
*FTA or WTO upon discretion of the complainant;
*Third party can insist on
FTA;
*Duplication precluded:
once either system invoked,
other excluded (Art. 77)

*FTA mechanism without
prejudice to other fora;
*once procedure initiated,
other fora precluded unless
"substantially separate and
distinct rights or obligations under different international agreements are in
dispute" or parties agree to
resort to several for a.
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MECHANISM
(cont.)

EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION?

RELATIONSHIP
WITH OTHER FORA

3.GLOBAL TREATIES
WTO

Energy Charter Treaty

UN
Convention on the
Law of the Sea

Yes:
When
redress
sought for WTO
violations, must go
to DSU (Art. 23)
ECT trade mechanism only applies
if at least one disputing party is not
WTO member

No

None

*WTO agreements prevail
over ECT
*ECT trade panels "shall
be guided by" interpretations
by
WTO
panels/Appellate Body
*ECT Secretariat may seek
advice of WTO secretariat
*parties can select "any
peaceful means of their
choice" at any time;
*if method agreed upon
that "entails binding decision," then it applies in lieu
of UNCLOS

Based on the analysis above, the following conclusions may
be drawn.
First, in treaties setting up a customs union or other relatively closely integrated regional "community," the regional
mechanism for dispute settlements is most often "exclusive."
Members of the union or community have to bring their disputes
with other members to the regional forum. They are precluded
from bringing them to more universal fora such as the WTO.253
The only exception is MERCOSUR, where parties continue to
have a choice between the MERCOSUR mechanism and, for example, that of the WTO.254 Second, the more loosely integrated
FTAs examined above leave it to the complainant to decide

253.
254.

See supra tbl.3: pt.1.
See id.
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where to bring a particular trade dispute. 255 Only the South Africa-EC FTA includes a best endeavors clause to the effect that
disputes ought to be settled under the FTA rather than at the
WTO.2 56 In addition, some FTAs, such as NAFTA, provide for
exceptions where particular types of disputes must be settled at
the regional level if the defendant so wants or in case a third
party insists on bringing the same case to the regional mechanism. 257 Crucially, many of these FTAs also include a provision
precluding parties from bringing the same case a second time to
258
another forum.
D. WOULD WTO PANELS AND THE APPELLATE BODY RECOGNIZE
EXPLICIT CONFLICT CLAUSES IN A NON-WTO AGREEMENT?
Before we enter the discussion of what a judge can or
should do when there are no explicit conflict clauses dealing
with jurisdictional overlap, the question could be asked whether
the WTO judiciary would ever recognize and apply such conflict
clauses set out in other non-WTO agreements, say, an exclusive
jurisdiction clause in Annex VI or an SADC clause stating that
once a party invokes the SADC mechanism it is precluded from
relying thereafter on the WTO mechanism. This question goes
to the heart of what can be part of the applicable law before
WTO panels. 259 Some scholars argue that WTO panels can apply only WTO rules.260 If that is correct, then panels should
never decline jurisdiction based on a conflict clause set out in
another non-WTO treaty. Even if this other treaty reserves, for
example, exclusive jurisdiction to the regional mechanism for
the settlement of disputes, 261 the WTO cannot then apply this
exclusivity clause and must continue, in all circumstances, with
its examination of whether WTO law is violated. In contrast, if
WTO panels, in the examination of WTO claims, can take cognizance also of provisions in non-WTO agreements-a position
that this author defends 262-then a defendant should be permitted to rely on an exclusive jurisdiction clause. When the condi-

255. See supra tbl.3: pt.2.
256. See id.
257. See supra Part III.B.1.
258. See supra tbl.3: pt.2. NAFTA, ASEAN, the U.S.-Isr. FTA, and the EFTAMex. FTA all contain non-duplication provisions. Id.
259. See supra Part II.
260. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
261. As does Article 292 of the EC Treaty. See supra note 171.
262. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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tions in this clause are met, a WTO panel should then give effect
to this clause and decline to exercise jurisdiction.
So far, no WTO panel has been asked to decide on the effect
of a conflict clause in a non-WTO treaty that would preclude the
exercise of WTO jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in a recent panel report in which Brazil invoked WTO dispute settlement after it
had unsuccessfully relied on MERCOSUR arbitration, the panel
seemed to imply that it would give effect to jurisdictional conflict rules in non-WTO agreements. 263 However, in that case the
new Olivos Protocol on MERCOSUR dispute settlement, which
includes such conflict rules, was not yet applicable. 264 In particular, Article 1(2) of the Olivos Protocol states that once a procedure has begun in one forum, none of the parties may rely on
any other forum. 265 The panel noted that the earlier Protocol of
Brasilia, which still applied to the case at hand, "imposes no restrictions on Brazil's right to bring subsequent WTO dispute
settlement proceedings in respect of the same measure." 266
However, the panel also went on to note the following:
We note that Brazil signed the Protocol of Olivos in February 2002.
Article 1 of the Protocol of Olivos provides that once a party decides to
bring a case under either the MERCOSUR or WTO dispute settlement
forums, that party may not bring a subsequent case regarding the
same subject-matter in the other forum. The Protocol of Olivos, however, does not change our assessment, since that Protocol has not yet
entered into force, and in any event it does not apply in respect of disputes already decided in accordance with the MERCOSUR Protocol of
267
Indeed, the fact that parties to MERCOSUR saw the need
Brasilia.
to introduce the Protocol of Olivos suggests to us that they recognised
that (in the absence of such Protocol) a MERCOSUR dispute settledispute settlement proment proceeding could be followed by a2 6WTO
8
ceeding in respect of the same measure.

These considerations indicate a willingness on behalf of the
WTO panel to apply exclusion clauses in other non-WTO treaties. Indeed, if such non-WTO rules could never play a role before a WTO panel, then surely the panel would not have bothered explaining and assessing their impact.

263. Brazil Poultry,supra note 205, paras. 7.17-7.42.
264. Olivos Protocol, supra note 199.
265. Id. art. 1(2).
266. Brazil Poultry,supra note 205, para. 7.38.
267. Olivos Protocol, supra note 199, art. 50 (providing that "disputes underway
initiated in accordance with the Protocol of Brasilia will continue to be exclusively
governed by that Protocol until the dispute has been concluded").
268. Brazil Poultry, supra note 205, para. 7.38.
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If the MERCOSUR dispute were resolved under the Olivos
Protocol, thus triggering the MERCOSUR exclusion clause, a
WTO panel, in this author's view, should give effect to this exclusion clause. A WTO panel must examine its own jurisdiction.
MERCOSUR parties agreed to take away this jurisdiction when
two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the dispute is one "falling within
the scope of application of [the Olivos] Protocol that may also be
referred to the dispute settlement system of the [WTO]"; and (2)
the dispute is, or has been examined already by a MERCOSUR
panel. 269 Consequently, if both of these conditions are met, any

WTO panel must conclude that-by agreement of the disputing
parties-itdoes not have jurisdiction to re-examine the dispute.
An example of an international tribunal applying and giving deference to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in another
treaty under which it had not itself jurisdiction is the recent Order of the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of
UNCLOS in the MOX Plant case. 2 70 In that case, the Tribunal,
acting under UNCLOS, suspended its proceedings based, inter
271
alia, on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the EC Treaty.

Another confirmation that international tribunals must take
cognisance of jurisdiction clauses in legal instruments other
than those for which they have been granted jurisdiction is the
Decision on Annulment in Compania de Aguas del Aconquija
S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic. 272 Faced with a

situation that gave rise to claims under both a bilateral investment treaty, for which the Tribunal had jurisdiction, and a domestic concession contract, for which domestic courts had exclusive jurisdiction, the Annulment Committee, reviewing the
original Tribunal, found as follows:
In a case where the essential basis of a claim brought before an international tribunal is a breach of contract, the [international] tribunal
will give effect to any valid choice of forum clause in the contract ....
On the other hand, where "the fundamental basis of the claim" is a

269. Olivos Protocol, supra note 199, art. 1. Interestingly, the JSEPA adds a
third condition precedent before one procedure may exclude another (not present
under either NAFTA or MERCOSUR). Namely, the exclusion does not apply "if substantially separate and distinct rights or obligations under different international
agreements are in dispute." JSEPA, supra note 228, art. 139(3). This may be a wise
addition in order to avoid exclusion in case the substantive claims under both procedures are markedly different. At the same time, it adds a complexity in that the
second panel or tribunal must decide whether the procedure before it raises "substantially separate and distinct rights or obligations." Id.
270. The MOX Plant Case, 42 I.L.M. at 1187.
271. Id. at 1191.
272. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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treaty laying down an independent standard by which the conduct of
the parties is to be judged, the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction
clause in a contract between the claimant and the respondent state...
273
cannot operate as a bar to the application of the treaty standard.

E. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW TO BE APPLIED IN THE
ABSENCE OF EXPLICIT TREATY PROVISIONS

1. To Decide Which Court or Tribunal Has Jurisdiction:Lex
Specialis, Lex Posterior, and Forum Non-Conveniens.
As Gabrielle Marceau states, "in the absence of any other
specific treaty prescription, the rules and principles of treaty interpretation and on conflicts applicable to the substantive provisions of treaties ...are also applicable to the issue of the over-

lap

or

conflict

mechanisms."

274

of

their

respective

dispute

settlement

In determining jurisdictional issues, in the ab-

sence of conflict clauses in the relevant treaties, an international court or tribunal may decide that the more specific treaty
provision that confers jurisdiction prevails over the more general one. As one commentator has noted:
In circumstances where the parties have made special provision for a
certain category of disputes, in the absence of any indication to the
contrary it must be supposed that they intended that it is this special
provision, and not some more general acceptance of the jurisdiction of
another tribunal, that they intended should be applied to disputes in
2 75
that category.

One might use this principle of lex specialis2 76 as an argument in favor of an SADC panel having jurisdiction over a particular dispute, rather than a WTO panel, in the absence of any
new treaty provisions that would regulate their relationship.
Moreover, the fact that the SADC mechanism was created later
in time than the WTO mechanism could provide further support
for this claim, especially since the Vienna Convention expressly
adopts the lex posterior principle. 277

273. In re Annulment Proceeding in the Arbitration between Compania de
Aguas del Aconquija, 41 I.L.M. at 1155-56.
274. Marceau, supra note 115, at 1110.
275. Vaughan Lowe, Overlapping Jurisdiction in International Tribunals, 20
AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 191, 195 (1999).
276. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
277. Vienna Convention, supranote 119, art. 30, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339-40.
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Nonetheless, under current law, it is unlikely that a WTO
panel would refuse to examine claims under WTO rules, even if
the dispute involved two SADC members, simply because the
SADC dispute settlement mechanism is more specific and/or
more recent. 278 The SADC panel mechanism does not reserve
exclusive jurisdiction to SADC trade panels to examine all trade
disputes as between SADC members. It grants only automatic
jurisdiction to SADC trade panels for disputes "between Member States concerning their rights and obligations under this
[SADC] Protocol on Trade."279 As a result, disputes between
SADC members concerning their rights and obligations under
WTO agreements can still be decided elsewhere. Moreover, the
DSU grants exclusive jurisdiction to WTO panels to examine
such WTO claims. 28 0 Consequently, the jurisdiction conferred to
WTO panels to examine WTO claims between SADC members
in the 1995 WTO agreements does not seem to have lost its force
to the more specific SADC Protocol on Trade. In this sense, no
jurisdictional conflict exists between the two, and thus there is
no need to apply the principle of lex specialis. As a result, both
jurisdictions continue to operate concurrently in their own
sphere of operation (SADC panels dealing with SADC claims;
WTO panels dealing with WTO claims), with the risk, discussed
earlier, of divergent outcomes and/or duplication of proceedings
on the same subject matter.
Moreover, some have asked whether the domestic law
doctrine of forum non conveniens28 1 can be applied to the international legal system. This doctrine could lead an international
court or tribunal to decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that some other forum is more "appropriate," in the sense of being more suitable for the ends of justice. 28 2 In domestic legal
278. A recent WTO panel confirmed this when making rulings on a particular
measure even though that measure had previously been dealt with under
MERCOSUR arbitration. Brazil Poultry, supra note 205, paras. 7.17-7.42. However, the panel made clear that the Olivos Protocol, with its exclusive jurisdiction
clause quoted above, had not yet entered into force and therefore did not apply to the
present dispute. Id. The panel thereby seemed to imply that in the event that the
exclusive jurisdiction clause had applied, a WTO panel may have to decline to exercise jurisdiction.
279. SADC Protocol on Trade, supranote 6, art. 32 (emphasis added).
280. DSU, supra note 9, art. 23.
281. Forum non conveniens "refers to discretionary power of court to decline jurisdiction when convenience of parties and ends of justice would be better served if
action were brought and tried in another forum." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th
ed. 1990).
282. Id.
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systems, criteria at play in deciding on the appropriate forum
commonly include nexus factors, expenses, availability of witnesses, the law governing the transaction, the place where the
parties reside or carry on business, the interest of the parties,
and the general interest of justice. 28 3 However, commentators
have argued that, at present, it would be difficult to transpose
this doctrine to the international law. For example, Lowe argues "criteria developed in the context of a proper concern for
the interest of private litigants make little sense in the context
of inter-state proceedings." 28 4 In turn, Marceau states that "the
WTO forum is always a 'convenient forum' for any WTO grievance; in fact it seems to be the exclusive forum for WTO mat28 5
ters."
2. To Avoid Duplication:Res Judicata, Abuse of Process, and
Lis Alibi Pendens
The potential for jurisdictional overlap described in Part I
not only raises the question of which court or tribunal to select,
but it also raises the risk of duplicating the proceedings. For
example, can an SADC member that first initiated a dispute at
SADC subsequently bring the same dispute to the WTO, or viceversa? The principle of res judicata militates against such an
outcome. The general principle behind res judicata is "that a
right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and distinctly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed."28 6 Nonetheless, three conditions
must be met in order for the principle of res judicata to apply.
They are: (1) identity of parties; (2) identity of object or subject
matter (it must be the very same issue that is in question); and
28 7
(3) identity of the legal cause of action.
The WTO Appellate Body recently confirmed these conditions in respect of the res judicata effect of WTO panel reports
when it stated as follows:

283.

See, e.g., 1 DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 385-451 (Law-

rence Collins ed., 13th ed. 2000).
284. Lowe, supra note 275, at 201.
285. Kyung Kwak & Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Between the WTO and RTAs, Apr. 26, 2002, at 8, at http://www.wto.org/englishl
tratop-e/regione/sem-aprilO2e/marceau.pdf Gast visited Nov. 21, 2003).
286. Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, 89 I.L.R. 368, 552, 560 (Int'l Ctr. For the Settlement of Inv. Disputes 1988).
287. Vaughan Lowe, Res Judicataand the Rule of Law in InternationalArbitration, 8 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 38, 40 (1996).
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[I]n our view, an unappealed finding included in a panel report that is
adopted by the DSB must be treated as a final resolution to a dispute
between the parties in respect of the particularclaim and the specific
288
component of a measure that is the subject of that claim.

Thus, a court or tribunal is precluded only from examining
a dispute, or that part of a dispute, which has been litigated beforehand as between the exact same parties, over the identical
issue and under the identical legal cause of action. 28 9 The fact
that one SADC member has sued another before SADC does not
preclude a third SADC member from challenging the same
measure at the WTO or even at a second SADC proceeding. In
such cases, res judicata does not apply because there is no identity of parties. More importantly, in principle, a legal finding by
an SADC panel under an SADC claim does not have binding or
res judicata force before a WTO panel examining a claim under
WTO provisions. In that case, although the parties and subject
matter may be the same, the legal cause of action is different as
it arises under a different treaty/agreement.
Nonetheless, when the SADC and the WTO provisions under which the respective claims are made are in substance the
same (for instance, both raise a violation of the national treatment principle), one could argue that the doctrine of issue estoppel or collateral estoppel applies. Under English law, the following three requirements must be met for issue estoppel to
apply:
(1) That the same question has been decided; (2) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel is final; and, (3) that the
parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is
290
raised or their privies.

In other words, under English law, the requirements for issue estoppel are identical to the requirements for traditional res
judicata to apply, minus the requirement of identity of cause.
288. WTO Appellate Body Report, EC-Anti-Dumping Duties on imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India-Recourseto Article 21.5 of the DSU by India, para.
93, WT/DS141/AB/RW (Apr. 8, 2003), http://www.wto.org (emphasis added). The
principle of res judicata was also confirmed in respect of Appellate Body reports.
WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products-Recourseto Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, paras. 9296, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001), http://www.wto.org.
289. See Lowe, supra note 287, at 40.
290. Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., 1 A.C. 853, 935 (H.L. 1966) (opinion of
Lord Guest).
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Under United States law, a similar doctrine is known as collateral estoppel. "Collateralestoppel extends the res judicata effect
of a judgment to encompass the same issues arising in a different action ("issue preclusion") and even to different parties
where the issue has been determined in prior litigation with
adequate opportunity to be heard for the party to be precluded."

291

As a result, if issue estoppel were to apply before a WTO
panel, then a WTO panel could preclude an SADC member from
bringing a claim previously decided by an SADC panel between
the same parties. A WTO panel also could apply issue estoppel
to the determination of facts and to the legal characterizations
of facts by the previous SADC panel, or vice versa. The American doctrine of collateral estoppel could go even further and give
res judicata effect to a previous SADC panel finding on the same
issue. This is true even if that panel was constituted at the request of a different SADC member challenging the measure at
the WTO, in the event the former SADC member had "adequate
292
opportunity to be heard" before the original SADC panel.

However, a panel recently refused to apply the basic principle of estoppel in respect of a claim defended against by Argentina. 293 Argentina argued that the fact that Brazil had chal-

lenged the same measure

previously before MERCOSUR

estopped Brazil from bringing the case again before the WTO.294

Argentina explicitly refused to invoke the principle of res judicata.295 Although the panel refused to decide on whether or not
296
it
the principle of estoppel can apply before a WTO panel,

used the following three conditions for estoppel to be activated:
"(i) a statement of fact which is clear and unambiguous; (ii) this
statement must be voluntary, unconditional, and authorized;
(iii) there must be reliance in good faith."297 When applying the

first condition, the panel did not consider "that Brazil has made
a clear and unambiguous statement to the effect that, having
brought a case under the MERCOSUR dispute settlement
framework, it would not subsequently resort to WTO dispute

291.

added).
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

EUGENE F.

SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1141 (2000) (emphasis

Id.
Brazil Poultry, supra note 205, paras. 7.17-7.42.
Id. para. 7.37.
Id. para. 7.33 n.53.
Id. para. 7.38 n.58.
Id. para. 7.20.

294
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settlement proceedings ... ,"298 This is especially because the
Protocol of Brasilia, under which previous MERCOSUR cases
had been brought by Brazil, imposes no restrictions on Brazil's
right to bring subsequent WTO dispute settlement proceedings
in respect of the same measure. 299 On these grounds, the panel
refused to apply the principle of estoppel and continued to exam300
ine Brazil's claims.
A second principle, distinct from res judicata, that may prevent needless and costly duplication of proceedings on the same
matter, as between the same parties, is the doctrine of abuse of
process. This doctrine
indicates that a tribunal should decline to exercise jurisdiction in a
range of circumstances where the action is rendered vexatious. These
include cases where the purpose of the litigation is to harass the defendant, or the claim is frivolous or manifestly groundless, or the claim
is one which could and should have been raised in earlier proceed301
ings.

Third, in the event duplication arises before the initial tribunal has finalized its ruling, the second tribunal could make an
end to the duplication by applying the doctrine of lis alibi
pendens.302 The principle of lis alibi pendens could be invoked
by an SADC panel to decline jurisdiction in a case that is substantially identical to one that has already been referred to the
WTO, or vice versa. At the same time, the doctrine of lis alibi
pendens should not result in a general rule that the initial tribunal decides a dispute. 30 3 Before proceeding with the case, this
298. Id. para. 7.38.
299. Brazil Poultry, supra note 205, para. 7.38.
300. Id.
301. Lowe, supra note 275, at 202-03. However, a recent WTO panel rejected
the argument that bringing a WTO dispute after having submitted the same measure to another dispute settlement mechanism, in casu MERCOSUR, amounts to a
failure "to act in good faith." Brazil Poultry, supra note 205, para. 7.36. The panel
did so on the ground that Argentina, which invoked breach of the principle of good
faith, did not point to any substantive WTO provision that Brazil could have violated. Id. para. 7.38.
302. As one scholar has noted,
Lis alibipendens was said by the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the Polish Upper Silesia Case to have as its object the prevention of the
possibility of conflicting judgments. It might have added that it also avoids
the danger of a race to judgment between two tribunals, which is itself inimical to good order in judicial proceedings. The doctrine indicates that if a
substantially identical case is already pending before a competent tribunal,
the forum may decline to exercise its own jurisdiction.
Lowe, supra note 275, at 202.
303. If such a rule were adopted, one would have a senseless "race to court," the
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first tribunal should examine whether relevant treaty provisions
on jurisdictional overlap preclude its jurisdiction or grant jurisdiction to another court or tribunal, even if this other court or
tribunal was yet to hear the matter.
Finally, adjudicating the same dispute before two different
tribunals does not necessarily amount to wasteful duplication.
In case each of the two tribunals deals with clearly distinct matters-such as a WTO or SADC panel dealing with trade-related
claims and ITLOS with matters related to the law of the sea or
conservation-multiple proceedings may actually be helpful as
long as each tribunal stays within the limits of its jurisdiction
and defers to the other tribunal when it comes to deciding matters falling within that tribunal's jurisdiction.
IV: CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO AMEND SADC RULES
Amendments to Annex VI disputes could (1) avoid the duplication of dispute settlement proceedings and (2) steer parties
to the forum that is best suited to resolve a particular dispute,
30 4
be it the SADC mechanism or another mechanism.
This Part first addresses the relationship between the
SADC trade mechanism and the SADC Tribunal, and then offers several options to regulate the interaction between the
SADC trade mechanism and other, non-SADC dispute settlement mechanisms, be they of a sub-regional nature or of a
global nature.
A.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE SADC TRIBUNAL

Part I explained the potential for overlap with the SADC
Tribunal.
It addressed a number of questions, including
whether parties may bring disputes under the Protocol on Trade
to the SADC Tribunal, whether SADC trade panel decisions can
be "appealed" to the SADC Tribunal, and what happens if a dispute is covered under both the Protocol on Trade and another
SADC agreement. There seems to be a need to provide legal
predictability and to avoid duplication of proceedings. The overlap could be regulated in one of three ways.
first tribunal seized necessarily having jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others.
Besides the fact that other rules regulate jurisdictional overlaps, as explained above,
such a rule based purely on timing would be completely arbitrary.
304. See supra Part II (discussing Annex VI). Accordingly, SADC members
would decide which forum is best suited to resolve particular disputes.
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1. The SADC Tribunal Has No Competence for Disputes
Arising under the Protocol on Trade
To ensure that the SADC Tribunal would not face any dispute under the Protocol on Trade, the following provision could
be added either to Article 32 of the Protocol on Trade or to Article 1 of Annex VI: "A dispute between Member States concerning their rights and obligations under this Protocol [the Protocol
on Trade] shall not be settled under Article 32 of the Treaty
[unless the Member States parties to the dispute so agree]."
A similar delineation between the specific trade mechanism
and the more general provisions on dispute settlement is found
in the Energy Charter Treaty. 305 With these additions, even disputes falling under both the Protocol on Trade and any other
SADC agreement or protocol would fall within the exclusive
mandate of SADC trade panels. To mitigate that effect, one
could add the following:
However, in the event a dispute between Member States concerns
rights and obligations both under this Protocol and under any other
SADC provision, the parties shall consult with a view to agreement on
a single forum. If the parties cannot agree, the dispute shall be settled
[under this Protocol] [by the SADC Tribunal].

2. Rulings by SADC Trade Panels Can Be Appealed to the
SADC Tribunal
To provide for appellate review of SADC trade panel reports, a new Article 15 bis could be added in Annex VI providing
for appellate review of panel reports by the SADC Tribunal.
Consequential changes should be made throughout Annex VI.
Also, the Protocol on Tribunal, in particular Article 14 on "Basis
of Jurisdiction," then should be modified to expand the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to include appeals to panel reports. In this
respect, it should be recalled that a growing number of trade
dispute settlement mechanisms (including WTO, MERCOSUR
and ASEAN) provide for the opportunity to appeal trade panels
before a standing appeals body. 30 6 This may increase the predictability, objectivity, and legitimacy of the system.

305. Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 233, art. 28, 34 I.L.M. at 402.
306. See Olivos Protocol, supra note 199, art. 17; ASEAN Protocol, supra note
213, art. 8; DSU, supra note 9, art. 17.
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3. The SADC Tribunal Should Be Given Jurisdictionto Deal
with Trade Disputes and the Panel System Should Be Abolished
In order to give the SADC Tribunal Jurisdiction over trade
disputes, the first paragraph in Article 32 of the Protocol on
Trade, which refers to Annex VI, should be abolished, as well as
Annex VI in its entirety. Article 32 of the Protocol should then
read: "Any disputes regarding the interpretation and application
of this Protocol shall be settled in accordance with Article 32 of
the SADC Treaty."
Having one uniform SADC dispute settlement mechanism,
namely under the SADC Tribunal, would have clear advantages.
It would provide legal predictability, avoid overlaps, and provide
homogeneity. Most customs unions and more developed regional communities-including the EC, the Andean Community,
and CARICOM-have this type of uniform mechanism and do
not distinguish between trade disputes and other disputes, the
former being subject to ad hoc panels, the latter to a standing
regional court. 307 Also, the African Economic Community 30 8 and
the African Union 309 provide for a Court of Justice and do not
have a WTO-like panel system to settle trade disputes.
B. RELATIONSHIP TO NON-SADC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISMS

The overlap between SADC trade panels and any nonSADC international dispute settlement mechanism between
SADC members, in turn, can be regulated in several ways.
1. SADC Trade PanelsHave Exclusive Jurisdictionto Deal
with Trade Disputes as Between SADC Members
To grant SADC Trade Panels Exclusive Jurisdiction to Deal
with Trade Disputes between SADC members, the following
provision should become Article 1 of Annex VI: "[Unless the disputing parties agree otherwise,] Member States undertake not
to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of this Protocol to any method of settlement other than those
provided in this Annex." Or, in the event it is regarded as preferable to specify other agreements: "Disputes regarding any
307.
308.
309.

See supra Part III.A (discussing EC, ANDEAN and CARICOM treaties).
See Abuja Treaty, supranote 36, art. 18, 30 I.L.M. at 1259.
See supra note 51.
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matter arising under both this Protocol and [any other international agreement binding on the disputing parties] [the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or any successor agreement to it] shall be settled only pursuant to the
provisions in this Annex." This would follow the examples of the
European Community and the Andean Community, discussed
earlier,3 10 where member states agreed not to bring disputes
under community rules to other fora, be it the broader WTO system or smaller sub-regional mechanisms. As noted earlier, most
customs unions and more developed regional communities reserve exclusive jurisdiction to the regional mechanism. 3 11
Part II discussed the advantages of settling disputes at the
regional SADC level. Nonetheless, this Article also identifies
some benefits related to bringing disputes to, for example, the
WTO. Moreover, SADC aims at a free trade area rather than a
customs union, and as we saw earlier, FTAs generally do not reserve exclusive jurisdiction to the FTA dispute settlement
mechanism. 312 As a result, to deny to SADC members the right
to settle their trade disputes elsewhere, be it at the WTO or at a
smaller regional entity, such as SACU, may go too far. However, this option of reserving exclusive jurisdiction to SADC
trade panels may become more attractive once SADC becomes a
customs union or a more closely integrated community.
2. SADC Trade Panels Do Not Have Exclusive Jurisdiction;
Choice of Forum Is Left to the Complainant (with Possible
Exceptions); DuplicationIs Precluded (with Possible Exceptions)
To address the problems of duplication, the following should
also be included in Article 1 of Annex VI, entitled "Choice of Forum":
1. The provisions of this Annex are without prejudice to the rights of
Member States to have recourse to dispute settlement procedures
available under other agreements to which they are party.
2. However, once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated
at one forum, the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of all
others.

In addition, Member States could add precision as to when
dispute settlement procedures are deemed to be initiated. For
310.
311.
312.

See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.2.
See supra tbl.3: pt.1.
Id.

2004]

GOING GLOBAL, REGIONAL, OR BOTH?

instance, at ASEAN, a second procedure can be initiated up 31to3
the point that a ruling is made on the ASEAN panel report.
This leaves the possibility that ASEAN members may go
through an entire procedure, up to the final panel report, and
thereafter have to go through another procedure before the
WTO, as long as the WTO procedure is initiated before a ruling
is made on the ASEAN panel report. This approach risks duplication of proceedings that, in turn, may result in a waste of
scarce resources. At the same time, to consider a request for
consultations as "initiating dispute settlement procedures" may
go too far in the other direction. For example, there may be
situations where initial consultations at the WTO are more appropriate or helpful, but where, after such consultations are
held, the complainant, or even both parties, decides to settle the
dispute at SADC. Thus, one could add the following sentence,
based on Article 2005(7) of NAFTA, to paragraph 2 above: "For
purposes of this Article, a request for consultations or negotiations alone is not deemed to initiate dispute settlement proceedings."
This solution to the problem of overlap, leaving the choice of
forum up to the complainant, is the solution adopted in NAFTA,
314
ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and most free trade arrangements.
Since SADC is supposed to be a free trade area, rather than a
customs union, it may also be the most appropriate approach.
This approach then could be further fine-tuned in three ways.
First, although one could have the general principle of
choice of forum depending on the complainant, one could grant a
right to defendants to have a particular type of dispute settled
at SADC. This is done, for instance, in NAFTA for certain environmental, health, and standard-related disputes. 3 15 In SADC,
this right could be reserved, for example, for disputes regarding
safeguards where, depending on the negotiations, SADC safeguards may be easier to impose than WTO safeguards. Such a
right to have a dispute heard at SADC to the exclusion of all
other fora could be given for any type of dispute that SADC
members would prefer to see handled in SADC rather than, for
example, the WTO, be it because the dispute is too sensitive,
better regulated in SADC, etc. To give such preferential treatment to the SADC dispute settlement mechanism, the following
could be added to Article 1 bis above:
313.
314.
315.

See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 204, 209, 217 and accompanying text.
NAFTA, supranote 207, art. 2005, 32 I.L.M at 694.
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3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, in any dispute
where the responding Member State claims that its action is subject to
[provisions on special safeguards ... ] and requests in writing that the
matter be considered under this Protocol, the complaining Member
State may, in respect of that matter, thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely under this Protocol.

Second, disputes may arise between two SADC members
that are of interest to other SADC members. One complainant
may want to bring the dispute to SADC, the other to the WTO.
Since the complainant decides where to bring the dispute, a risk
of conflicting reports from SADC and the WTO arises. To avoid
this, one could add the following to Article 1 bis above:
Before a Member State initiates a dispute settlement proceeding under
any agreement other than this Protocol, that Member State shall notify all other Member States of its intention. If any third Member
State wishes to have recourse to dispute settlement procedures under
this Protocol regarding the same matter, it shall inform promptly the
notifying Member State and those Member States shall consult with a
view to agreement on a single forum. If those Member States cannot
3 16
agree, the dispute [normally] shall be settled under this Protocol.

Third, although duplication of procedures should be
avoided, there may be instances where a second procedure on
the same dispute addresses claims not yet dealt with in the first
procedure. For example, the first procedure under the SADC
Protocol on Trade may deal with the trade aspects of a dispute,
while a second procedure before the ICJ or ITLOS addresses
questions of border delimitation or conservation. To allow for
two proceedings in those cases, one could add the following to
Article 1 bis, paragraph 2, above: "This provision shall not apply
when, in respect of the same matter, a Member State bases its
complaint on a [substantially] different legal basis than that
317
available under the agreement that was first invoked."
3. Settlement under Smaller Arrangements (Such as SACU,
COMESA and ECCAS) Is Preferred over Settlement at SADC
If the preferred approach is that settlements under smaller
agreements are favored over settlements at SADC, meaning
that in choice of forum instances the sub-regional arrangement
prevails over SADC, then the first two paragraphs of Article 1
bis suggested above could be included in Annex VI, while adding

316.
317.

This provision is based on art. 2005(2) of NAFTA.
This provision is based on art. 77 of JSEPA.
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the following paragraph 3:
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, disputes arising
between Members States that are party also to a sub-regional integration agreement on matters governed by such agreement shall be subject to the dispute settlement procedures of that other agreement to
the exclusion of the dispute settlement procedures in this Protocol.

To allow for two proceedings in case both cover substantially different legal claims, the following could be added to
paragraph 3: "This provision shall not apply when, in respect of
the same matter, a Member State bases its complaint under this
Protocol on a [substantially] different legal basis than that
available under the sub-regional integration agreement."
In case SADC members would always want to give preference to WTO procedures over SADC procedures, a similar provision could be included referring to a "WTO agreement" instead
of "a sub-regional integration agreement."
4. Settlement at SADC Is Preferredover Settlement at Broader
Mechanisms Such as the African Economic Community or the
WTO

If one prefers settlements at SADC rather than settlements
at global regimes, the first two paragraphs of Article 1 bis suggested above could be included in Annex VI, while adding the
following paragraph 3:
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, Member States
undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Protocol to dispute settlement procedures [under the
African Economic Community/African Union] [at the World Trade Organization] [unless such complaint would be made on a [substantially]
different legal basis than that available under this Protocol].

In this respect, recall that the Abuja Treaty encourages subregional economic integration and seems generally to prefer the
settlement of matters at a sub-regional level, such as that of
SADC.318
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the potential for overlap between the
SADC dispute settlement mechanism on trade and other international dispute settlement regimes. Many overlaps are identi318.

See supra Part I.
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fled. Some of the other systems that overlap with the SADC
mechanism are also trade-related, such as the WTO, SACU,
COMESA, ECCAS, or the African Economic Community, while
others have a more general jurisdiction, such as the SADC Tribunal, the Court of Justice of the African Union or the International Court of Justice, or another, non-trade related specialized
jurisdiction-e.g., under MEAs or UNCLOS. Some of these
other mechanisms are within the African region; others are
more universal in nature.
Acknowledging that there is a serious potential for overlap,
Part II of the Article identifies the different factors that may influence SADC members to bring a dispute to either SADC or
another international forum. The following factors are examined: the cost of litigation, the organizational context in which
the dispute would be decided, the entity which would decide the
dispute, the advantages in the applicable law, who can initiate a
complaint and against whom, procedural advantages, special
procedures for least-developed countries, the possibility of appeal, the remedies that can be obtained, the parties who are
bound by any eventual ruling, and the consequences of noncompliance.
Upon reflection, it is difficult to make a general conclusion
as to which of the two regimes examined, that of the WTO or
that of SADC, is the better or more appropriate forum to resolve
trade disputes as between SADC members. Some factors plead
in favor of the WTO, others in favor of SADC, and even one factor may militate in favor of SADC and the WTO, depending on
the perspective one takes. Systemically, however, a good case
can be made that trade disputes as between SADC members
ought to be resolved at the SADC level. It makes little sense to
"globalize" a dispute that can be resolved regionally (factors of
"organizational context" and "who decides the dispute"). Moreover, given that SADC is to become a "free trade area," SADC
rights and obligations are likely to be stricter and more specific
than those at the WTO, so arguably that is where disputes
ought to be resolved (factor of the "applicable law").
At the same time, as the rules now stand, a number of factors plead in favor of the WTO: (1) Cost of litigation that is
borne largely by the WTO budget and the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law; (2) the more neutral selection of panelists and the
possibility to appeal; (3) preferential treatment for leastdeveloped countries; and (4) the larger WTO membership, a feature that may put more political pressure on the parties to re-
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solve the dispute, create broader precedents, and avoid duplication of litigation against the same measure.
Part III of the Article provided a comparative analysis. It
explained how the problem of overlapping fora has been addressed in other international regimes. It noted that none of the
treaties concluded on the African continent discussed in this Article, SACU, COMESA, ECCAS, African Economic Community
or African Union, explicitly addresses the issue of overlap. Part
III concluded that, in treaties setting up a customs union or
other relatively closely integrated regional community, the regional dispute settlement mechanism is most often exclusive.
Members of the union or community are required to bring their
disputes with other members to the regional forum. They are
precluded from bringing them to more universal fora such as the
WTO. The only exception discussed is MERCOSUR, where parties continue to have a choice between the MERCOSUR mechanism and, for example, that of the WTO. In contrast, the more
loosely integrated free trade agreements normally leave it to the
complainant to decide where to bring a particular trade dispute.
The complainant can bring it either under the FTA mechanism
or to the WTO. Only the South Africa-EC FTA includes a best
endeavors clause to the effect that disputes ought to be settled
under the FTA rather than at the WTO. In addition, some
FTAs, such as NAFTA, provide for exceptions where particular
types of disputes must be settled at the regional level if the defendant desires, or in case a third party insists on bringing the
same case to the regional mechanism. Crucially, most of these
FTAs also include a provision precluding parties from bringing
the same case a second time to another forum.
Part III also examined whether the WTO judiciary ever
would apply jurisdictional conflict rules set out in other treaties.
This Article argues that it should. Lastly, Part III elaborated on
the general principles of law that international courts and tribunals may apply to resolve problems of jurisdictional overlap in
case no explicit conflict clauses are set out in the relevant treaties. Part III addressed principles that may be used to decide
which court or tribunal has jurisdiction, such as the lex specialis
and lex posterior principles, as well as principles that may be
useful to avoid duplication of proceedings, such as res judicata,
abuse of process, and lis alibi pendens.
Finally, Part IV offered concrete proposals to amend Annex
VI in order to (1) avoid duplicating dispute settlement proceedings, and (2) steer parties to the forum that is, according to a de-
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cision to be made by SADC members, best suited to resolve a
particular dispute, be it the SADC mechanism or another
mechanism. Part IV offered several options and leaves it to
SADC members to select the option that is most appropriate to
meet their needs. It addressed, first, the relationship between
the SADC trade mechanism and the SADC Tribunal, and second, the relationship between the SADC trade mechanism and
other dispute settlement mechanisms, be they sub-regional,
such as SACU, or global, such as the WTO.
The broader lesson to draw from the above exercise is that
overlaps between international courts and tribunals are manifold, complex, and likely to increase in the future. Moreover, no
one-forum-fits-all solution is available. By far the best approach
is for treaty negotiators to regulate explicitly the question of
overlap and choice of forum. If not, one must resort to general
principles of international law. Crucially, international courts
and tribunals can no longer close their eyes on the problem of
competing jurisdictions. Each of them has the inherent obligation first to establish its jurisdiction and in doing so to take cognizance of the jurisdiction of other tribunals, including conflict
clauses set out in other treaties. If so, the problem of overlapping jurisdictions can be contained and resolved in a uniform
manner, reaping the benefits of specialization and healthy competition, as well as unity and strong cooperation between international courts and tribunals.

